Seeing and believing: three episodes in the history of neurophysiology

In this contribution I look at three episodes in the history of neurophysiology that bring out the complex relationship between seeing and believing. I start with Vesalius in the mid-sixteenth century who writes that he can in no way see any cavity in nerves, even in the optic nerves. He thus questions the age-old theory (dating back to the Alexandrians in the third century BC) but, because of the overarching psychophysiology of his time, does not press his case. This conflict between observation and theory persisted for a quarter of a millennium until finally resolved at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the discoveries of Galvani and Volta. The second case is provided by the early history of retinal synaptology. Schultze in 1866 had represented rod spherules and bipolar dendrites in the outer plexiform layer as being separated by a (synaptic) gap, yet in his written account, because of his theoretical commitments, held them to be continuous. Cajal later, 1892, criticized Schultze for this pusillanimity, but his own figure in La Cellule is by no means clear. It was only with the advent of the electron microscopy in the mid-twentieth century that the true complexity of the junction was revealed and it was shown that both investigators were partially right. My final example comes from the Hodgkin-Huxley biophysics of the 1950s. Their theory of the action potential depended on the existence of unseen ion pores with quite complex biophysical characteristics. These were not seen until the Nobel-Prize-winning X-ray diffraction analyses of the early twenty-first century. Seeing, even at several removes, then confirmed Hodgkin and Huxley’s belief. The relation between seeing and believing is by no means straightforward.

Brain, mind and consciousness in the history of neuroscience

From Platonic and Galenic roots, the first well developed ventricular theory of brain function is due to Bishop Nemesius, fourth century C.E. Although more interested in the Christian concept of soul, St. Augustine, too addressed the question of the location of the soul, a problem that has endured in various guises to the present day. Other notable contributions to ventricular psychology are the ninth century C.E. Arabic writer, Qusta ibn Lūqā, and an early European medical text written by the twelfth century C.E. author, Nicolai the Physician. By the time of Albertus Magnus, so-called medieval cell doctrine was a well-developed model of brain function. By the sixteenth century, Vesalius no longer understands the ventricles to be imaginary cavities designed to provide a physical basis for faculty psychology but as fluid-filled spaces in the brain whose function is yet to be determined