EU governance of the internet:analyzing Europol’s role in the development of a EU cyber crime and cyber security policies

In recent years, the European Union has come to view cyber security, and in particular, cyber crime as one of the most relevant challenges to the completion of its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given European societies’ increased reliance on borderless and decentralized information technologies, this sector of activity has been identified as an easy target for actors such as organised criminals, hacktivists or terrorist networks. Such analysis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the fight against unlawful online activities, namely through increased cooperation among law enforcement authorities (both national and extra- communitarian), the approximation of legislations, and public- private partnerships. Although EU initiatives in this field have, so far, been characterized by a lack of interconnection and an integrated strategy, there has been, since the mid- 2000s, an attempt to develop a more cohesive and coordinated policy. An important part of this policy is connected to the activities of Europol, which have come to assume a central role in the coordination of intelligence gathering and analysis of cyber crime. The European Cybercrime Center (EC3), which will become operational within Europol in January 2013, is regarded, in particular, as a focal point of the EU’s fight against this phenomenon. Bearing this background in mind, the present article wishes to understand the role of Europol in the development of a European policy to counter the illegal use of the internet. The article proposes to reach this objective by analyzing, through the theoretical lenses of experimental governance, the evolution of this agency’s activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, its positioning as an expert in the field, and the consequences for the way this policy is currently developing and is expected to develop in the near future.

The governance of justice and internal security in Scotland:between the Scottish independence referendum and British decisions on the EU

This article examines how the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland could be affected by the outcome of the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014. The article argues that it is currently impossible to equate a specific result in the referendum with a given outcome for the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. This is because of the complexities of the current arrangements in that policy area and the existence of several changes that presently affect them and are outside the control of the government and of the people of Scotland. This article also identifies an important paradox. In the policy domain of justice and internal security, a ‘no’ vote could, in a specific set of circumstances, actually lead to more changes than a victory of the ‘yes’ camp.

Dialogue, partnership and empowerment for network and information security:the changing role of the private sector from objects of regulation to regulation shapers

The protection of cyberspace has become one of the highest security priorities of governments worldwide. The EU is not an exception in this context, given its rapidly developing cyber security policy. Since the 1990s, we could observe the creation of three broad areas of policy interest: cyber-crime, critical information infrastructures and cyber-defence. One of the main trends transversal to these areas is the importance that the private sector has come to assume within them. In particular in the area of critical information infrastructure protection, the private sector is seen as a key stakeholder, given that it currently operates most infrastructures in this area. As a result of this operative capacity, the private sector has come to be understood as the expert in network and information systems security, whose knowledge is crucial for the regulation of the field. Adopting a Regulatory Capitalism framework, complemented by insights from Network Governance, we can identify the shifting role of the private sector in this field from one of a victim in need of protection in the first phase, to a commercial actor bearing responsibility for ensuring network resilience in the second, to an active policy shaper in the third, participating in the regulation of NIS by providing technical expertise. By drawing insights from the above-mentioned frameworks, we can better understand how private actors are involved in shaping regulatory responses, as well as why they have been incorporated into these regulatory networks.