When electronic management tools work - and don't work - in social-based distribution channels:a study of IT manufacturers and resellers

Electronic information tools have become increasingly popular with channel manufacturers in their efforts to manage resellers. Although these tools have been found to increase the efficiency of communications, researchers and practitioners alike have questioned their effectiveness. To investigate how top-down electronic information affects social channel relationships we consider the use of such tools in information technology distribution channels. Using electronic communications theory and channel governance theory we hypothesize that the usefulness of the tools is a function of the type of information inherent in each tool (demand creation information or supply fulfillment information) and the particular communications characteristics of this information.

Two sides to attitudinal commitment:the effect of calculative and loyalty commitment on enforcement mechanism in distribution channels

Previous conceptualizations of attitudinal commitment are extended by considering two very different components of a manufacturer’s attachment to an independent channel intermediary. Relying on commitment theory, a model is developed that describes how attitudinal commitment may reside in either the instrumental or the social strain of a manufacturer’s relationship with its distributor. For each strain, the developmental role played by key facets of the channel setting—relative dependence, pledges, and trust—are shown. Furthermore, the nature of the attachment bond is posited to motivate very different governance mechanisms as the distribution agreement is enforced by either social or contractual means. Empirical support for the model demonstrates that an expanded view of attitudinal commitment is important in understanding the complex nature of attachment in channel relationships.

Power in distribution channels - Supplier assortment strategy for balancing power

This paper focuses on the move from buyer dominance toward interdependence between buyers and suppliers in a distribution channel. The paper introduces a case study collected through in-depth interviews and participative observations. It examines the relationships between a timber supplier and its customers in the builders' merchants sector. We stress the relevance of considering actions intended to change the power balance, rather than focusing only on trust. The power balance in a dyadic relationship is dynamic, and power positions need to be constantly re-evaluated. An important power resource is information asymmetry, manifested in the supplier's information about: products, regional and local demand, and the usage of the products. For practitioners, we highlight the possibility of exerting a non-coercive power resource, such as information asymmetry, in order to increase the relative power. Furthermore, being open about the power position between a buyer and a seller can foster a more efficient collaboration.

An examination of the consequences of market orientation in China

Recent literature suggests that the relationship between market orientation and business performance may be moderated by the nature of the external environment. While the conceptual arguments for such a relationship are well established, empirical evidence on the precise nature of this link has been both limited and ambiguous. The current paper provides further evidence on the nature of the links between market orientation, the environment and performance through a comparative analysis of two business sectors in China with distinctively different competitive environments. The results indicate that market orientation's impact on business performance is positive regardless of environmental conditions. However, the environment is found to moderate the relationship between market orientation and customer satisfaction. Finally, the study provides evidence that market orientation also has positive impacts on power in distribution channels and corporate social responsibility.

When do incentives work in channels of distribution?

The incentive dilemma refers to a situation in which incentives are offered but do not work as intended. The authors suggest that, in an interorganizational context, whether a principal-provided incentive works is a function of how it is evaluated by an agent: for its contribution to the agent's bottom line (instrumental evaluation) and for the extent it is strategically aligned with the agent's direction (congruence evaluation). To further understand when incentives work, the influence of two key contextual variables-industry volatility and dependence-are examined. A field study featuring 57 semi-structured depth interviews and 386 responses from twin surveys in the information technology and brewing industries provide data for hypothesis testing. When and whether incentives work is demonstrated by certain conditions under which the agent's evaluation of an incentive has positive or negative effects on its compliance and active representation. Further, some outcomes are reversed in the high volatility condition. © 2013 Academy of Marketing Science.

Method for computing the optimal signal distribution and channel capacity

An iterative method for computing the channel capacity of both discrete and continuous input, continuous output channels is proposed. The efficiency of new method is demonstrated in comparison with the classical Blahut - Arimoto algorithm for several known channels. Moreover, we also present a hybrid method combining advantages of both the Blahut - Arimoto algorithm and our iterative approach. The new method is especially efficient for the channels with a priory unknown discrete input alphabet.