ESpotter : adaptive named entity recognition for web browsing

Browsing constitutes an important part of the user information searching process on the Web. In this paper, we present a browser plug-in called ESpotter, which recognizes entities of various types on Web pages and highlights them according to their types to assist user browsing. ESpotter uses a range of standard named entity recognition techniques. In addition, a key new feature of ESpotter is that it addresses the problem of multiple domains on the Web by adapting lexicon and patterns to these domains.

From bilateral to trilateral governance in local government contracting in France

In France, the tradition of contracting out local public services has been predominantly one of partnership and co-operation rather than competition and antagonism. However, in recent years the traditional approach has come under intense criticism, something which has far-reaching implications for public-private governance. Adopting the socio-legal approach to the study of contract governance set out by Peter Vincent-Jones, this paper explores the discrepancy between descriptions of a traditional French approach to local public services governance, in which the bilateral values of trust and co-operation are emphasized, and a new discourse of local public services governance, which argues for detailed contract planning and close contract monitoring. It is argued that this discrepancy reveals the beginning of a shift in the governance of public service exchange relationships from relatively noncontractual and bilateral to relatively contractual and trilateral. The French case highlights the importance of regulatory and accountability frameworks to the manner in which contracting parties perceive exchange governance. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.

The franchise dilemma:entrepreneurial characteristics, relational contracting, and opportunism in hybrid governance

Using franchise data, we identify that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism by strengthening the opportunism-enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied, and exit the system.