Eyewitness testimony

Eyewitnesses have always played a fundamental role in the legal process. However, eyewitness evidence is not always as reliable or as accurate as one might hope, given the weight that decision-makers often ascribe to it. In this article, we review some of the many factors that can determine the reliability of witness testimony, including factors that are, and those that are not, within the control of investigative and judicial processes. In doing so, we consider how policies might assist in ensuring that witness testimony can play the most effective and informative role in the legal process as possible.

Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony?

False information can influence people's beliefs and memories. But can fabricated evidence induce individuals to accuse another person of doing something they never did? We examined whether exposure to a fabricated video could produce false eyewitness testimony. Subjects completed a gambling task alongside a confederate subject, and later we falsely told subjects that their partner had cheated on the task. Some subjects viewed a digitally manipulated video of their partner cheating; some were told that video evidence of the cheating exists; and others were not told anything about video evidence. Subjects were asked to sign a statement confirming that they witnessed the incident and that their corroboration could be used in disciplinary action against the accused. See-video subjects were three times more likely to sign the statement than Told-video and Control subjects. Fabricated evidence may, indeed, produce false eyewitness testimony; we discuss probable cognitive mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

An investigation into children’s inductive reasoning strategies:What drives the development of category induction?

In a series of studies, I investigated the developmental changes in children’s inductive reasoning strategy, methodological manipulations affecting the trajectory, and driving mechanisms behind the development of category induction. I systematically controlled the nature of the stimuli used, and employed a triad paradigm in which perceptual cues were directly pitted against category membership, to explore under which circumstances children used perceptual or category induction. My induction tasks were designed for children aged 3-9 years old using biologically plausible novel items. In Study 1, I tested 264 children. Using a wide age range allowed me to systematically investigate the developmental trajectory of induction. I also created two degrees of perceptual distractor – high and low – and explored whether the degree of perceptual similarity between target and test items altered children’s strategy preference. A further 52 children were tested in Study 2, to examine whether children showing a perceptual-bias were in fact basing their choice on maturation categories. A gradual transition was observed from perceptual to category induction. However, this transition could not be due to the inability to inhibit high perceptual distractors as children of all ages were equally distracted. Children were also not basing their strategy choices on maturation categories. In Study 3, I investigated category structure (featural vs. relational category rules) and domain (natural vs. artefact) on inductive preference. I tested 403 children. Each child was assigned to either the featural or relational condition, and completed both a natural kind and an artefact task. A further 98 children were tested in Study 4, on the effect of using stimuli labels during the tasks. I observed the same gradual transition from perceptual to category induction preference in Studies 3 and 4. This pattern was stable across domains, but children developed a category-bias one year later for relational categories, arguably due to the greater demands on executive function (EF) posed by these stimuli. Children who received labels during the task made significantly more category choices than those who did not receive labels, possibly due to priming effects. Having investigated influences affecting the developmental trajectory, I continued by exploring the driving mechanism behind the development of category induction. In Study 5, I tested 60 children on a battery of EF tasks as well as my induction task. None of the EF tasks were able to predict inductive variance, therefore EF development is unlikely to be the driving factor behind the transition. Finally in Study 6, I divided 252 children into either a comparison group or an intervention group. The intervention group took part in an interactive educational session at Twycross Zoo about animal adaptations. Both groups took part in four induction tasks, two before and two a week after the zoo visits. There was a significant increase in the number of category choices made in the intervention condition after the zoo visit, a result not observed in the comparison condition. This highlights the role of knowledge in supporting the transition from perceptual to category induction. I suggest that EF development may support induction development, but the driving mechanism behind the transition is an accumulation of knowledge, and an appreciation for the importance of category membership.

Negotiating proximity:expert testimony and collective memory in the trials of environmental activists in France and the United Kingdom

This article analyzes the role of expert witness testimony in the trials of social movement actors, discussing the trial of the "Kingsnorth Six" in Britain and the trials of activists currently mobilising against airport construction at Notre Dame des Landes in western France. Though the study of expert testimony has so far overwhelmingly concentrated on fact-finding and admissibility, the cases here reveal the importance of expert testimony not simply in terms of legal argument, but in "moral" or political terms, as it reflects and constitutes movement cognitive praxis. In the so-called climate change defence presented by the Kingsnorth Six, I argue that expert testimony attained a "negotiation of proximity," connecting different types of contributory expertise to link the scales and registers of climate science with those of everyday understanding and meaning. Expert testimony in the trials of activists in France, however, whilst ostensibly able to develop similar bridging narratives, has instead been used to construct resistance to the airport siting as already proximate, material, and embedded. To explain this, I argue that attention to the symbolic, as well as instrumental, functions of expert testimony reveals the crucial role that collective memory plays in the construction of both knowledge and grievance in these cases. Collective memory is both a constraint on and catalyst for mobilisation, defining the boundaries of the sayable. Testimony in trials both reflects and reproduces these elements and is a vital explanatory tool for understanding the narrativisation and communication of movement identities and objectives. © 2013 The Author. Law & Policy © 2013 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary.

Category structure affects the developmental trajectory of children’s inductive inferences for both natural kinds and artefacts

Inductive reasoning is fundamental to human cognition, yet it remains unclear how we develop this ability and what might influence our inductive choices. We created novel categories in which crucial factors such as domain and category structure were manipulated orthogonally. We trained 403 4-9-year-old children to categorise well-matched natural kind and artefact stimuli with either featural or relational category structure, followed by induction tasks. This wide age range allowed for the first full exploration of the developmental trajectory of inductive reasoning in both domains. We found a gradual transition from perceptual to categorical induction with age. This pattern was stable across domains, but interestingly, children showed a category bias one year later for relational categories. We hypothesise that the ability to use category information in inductive reasoning develops gradually, but is delayed when children need to process and apply more complex category structures. © 2014 © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

Does rapport-building boost the eyewitness eyeclosure effect in closed questioning?

Purpose: Several studies have documented that people's ability to correctly report details of witnessed events is enhanced when they merely close their eyes. Yet closing one's eyes in front of a stranger could sometimes create social discomfort, which other studies suggest can impair memory reports. This paper reports two experiments exploring the extent to which the memory benefits of eyeclosure are enhanced when efforts are taken to build interviewer/witness rapport, thus potentially reducing discomfort. Methods: In both studies participants observed filmed events and, afterwards, half underwent a basic rapport-building exercise with an interviewer. All participants then answered closed questions about specific details of the event, and half were instructed to close their eyes throughout this questioning. We recorded the proportion of questions answered correctly, incorrectly, or with 'don't know' responses. Results: Both eyeclosure and rapport-building separately enhanced correct responding. The data offer no evidence, though, that rapport-building moderated this eyeclosure benefit. This is despite the fact that rapport-building did appear to moderate the effect of eyeclosure on participants' self-reported comfort during the interviews. Conclusions: These studies give us initial cause for doubt over a hypothesized - but heretofore untested - social psychological constraint on the benefits of eyeclosure.