3 resultados para belief function

em Aston University Research Archive


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We consider a variation of the prototype combinatorial optimization problem known as graph colouring. Our optimization goal is to colour the vertices of a graph with a fixed number of colours, in a way to maximize the number of different colours present in the set of nearest neighbours of each given vertex. This problem, which we pictorially call palette-colouring, has been recently addressed as a basic example of a problem arising in the context of distributed data storage. Even though it has not been proved to be NP-complete, random search algorithms find the problem hard to solve. Heuristics based on a naive belief propagation algorithm are observed to work quite well in certain conditions. In this paper, we build upon the mentioned result, working out the correct belief propagation algorithm, which needs to take into account the many-body nature of the constraints present in this problem. This method improves the naive belief propagation approach at the cost of increased computational effort. We also investigate the emergence of a satisfiable-to-unsatisfiable 'phase transition' as a function of the vertex mean degree, for different ensembles of sparse random graphs in the large size ('thermodynamic') limit.

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Decentralised supply chain formation involves determining the set of producers within a network able to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem is frequently tackled using auctions and negotiations. In this paper we show how it can be cast as an optimisation of a pairwise cost function. Optimising this class of functions is NP-hard but good approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP). Here we detail a LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralised message-passing between potential participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known double-auction method and an optimal centralised technique, showing several improvements: it obtains better solutions for most networks that admit a competitive equilibrium Competitive equilibrium as defined in [3] is used as a means of classifying results on certain networks to allow for minor inefficiencies in their auction protocol and agent bidding strategies. while also solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions.

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Supply chain formation is the process by which a set of producers within a network determine the subset of these producers able to form a chain to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem has been tackled in a number of ways, including auctions, negotiations, and argumentation-based approaches. In this paper we show how this problem can be cast as an optimization of a pairwise cost function. Optimizing this class of energy functions is NP-hard but efficient approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using loopy belief propagation (LBP). Here we detail a max-sum LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralized message-passing between supply chain participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known decentralized double-auction method and an optimal centralized technique, showing several improvements on the auction method: it obtains better solutions for most network instances which allow for competitive equilibrium (Competitive equilibrium in Walsh and Wellman is a set of producer costs which permits a Pareto optimal state in which agents in the allocation receive non-negative surplus and agents not in the allocation would acquire non-positive surplus by participating in the supply chain) while also optimally solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.