10 resultados para autobiographical memory
em Aston University Research Archive
Resumo:
Background Depressed individuals have been consistently shown to exhibit problems in accessing specific memories of events from their past and instead tend to retrieve categorical summaries of events. The majority of studies examining autobiographical memory changes associated with psychopathology have tended to use word cues, but only one study to date has used images (with PTSD patients). Objective to determine if using images to cue autobiographical memories would reduce the memory specificity deficit exhibited by patients with depression in comparison to healthy controls. Methods Twenty-five clinically depressed patients and twenty-five healthy controls were assessed on two versions of the autobiographical memory test; cued with emotional words and images. Results Depressed patients retrieved significantly fewer specific memories, and a greater number of categorical, than did the controls. Controls retrieved a greater proportion of specific memories to images compared to words, whereas depressed patients retrieved a similar proportion of specific memories to both images and words. Limitations no information about the presence and severity of past trauma was collected. Conclusions results suggest that the overgeneral memory style in depression generalises from verbal to pictorial cues. This is important because retrieval to images may provide a more ecologically valid test of everyday memory experiences than word-cued retrieval.
Resumo:
The current study examined the role of executive function in retrieval of specific autobiographical memories in older adults with regard to control of emotion during retrieval. Older and younger adults retrieved memories of specific events in response to emotionally positive, negative and neutral word cues. Contributions of inhibitory and updating elements of executive function to variance in autobiographical specificity were assessed to determine processes involved in the commonly found age-related reduction in specificity. A negative relationship between age and specificity was only found in retrieval to neutral cues. Alternative explanations of this age preservation of specificity of emotional recall are explored, within the context of control of emotion in the self-memory system and preserved emotional processing and positivity effect in older adults. The pattern of relationships suggests updating, rather than inhibition as the source of age-related reduction in specificity, but that emotional processing (particularly of positively valenced memories) is not influenced by age-related variance in executive control. The tendency of older adults to focus on positive material may thus act as a buffer against detrimental effects of reduced executive function capacity on autobiographical retrieval, representing a possible target for interventions to improve specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval in older adults.
Resumo:
The primary aim was to examine to influence of subclinical disordered eating on autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) and social problem solving (SPS). A further aim was to establish if AMS mediated the relationship between eating psychopathology and SPS. A non-clinical sample of 52 females completed the autobiographical memory test (AMT), where they were asked to retrieve specific memories of events from their past in response to cue words, and the means-end problem-solving task (MEPS), where they were asked to generate means of solving a series of social problems. Participants also completed the Eating Disorders Inventory (EDI) and Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. After controlling for mood, high scores on the EDI subscales, particularly Drive-for-Thinness, were associated with the retrieval of fewer specific and a greater proportion of categorical memories on the AMT and with the generation of fewer and less effective means on the MEPS. Memory specificity fully mediated the relationship between eating psychopathology and SPS. These findings have implications for individuals exhibiting high levels of disordered eating, as poor AMS and SPS are likely to impact negatively on their psychological wellbeing and everyday social functioning and could represent a risk factor for the development of clinically significant eating disorders.
Resumo:
The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.
Resumo:
Doctored images can cause people to believe in and remember experiences that never occurred, yet the underlying mechanism(s) responsible are not well understood. How does compelling false evidence distort autobiographical memory? Subjects were filmed observing and copying a Research Assistant performing simple actions, then they returned 2 days later for a memory test. Before taking the test, subjects viewed video-clips of simple actions, including actions that they neither observed nor performed earlier. We varied the format of the video-clips between-subjects to tap into the source-monitoring mechanisms responsible for the 'doctored-evidence effect.' The distribution of belief and memory distortions across conditions suggests that at least two mechanisms are involved: doctored images create an illusion of familiarity, and also enhance the perceived credibility of false suggestions. These findings offer insight into how external evidence influences source-monitoring. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
The aim of this thesis was to extend previous research on intentional forgetting in depressed states. The first experiment used the think/no-think paradigm, and found that although dysphoric individuals were significantly worse at suppressing emotional (positive and negative) words than non-dysphoric individuals, both groups were unsuccessful at direct thought suppression. However, there was no effect of rumination on dysphoric individuals' ability to intentionally forget material. Furthermore, there was also no group differences in attentional measures of Stroop and IDEO. The second experiment involved modifying the TNT task, by including the use of substitute words in the suppression phase, in order to determine whether recalling substitute words during suppression would increase the level of forgetting. The findings from the study revealed that both dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals were successful at intentionally forgetting neutral words using a thought substitution strategy. However, both groups were impaired at suppressing words in the direct thought substitution condition. The third experiment investigated the influence of thought substitution on intentional forgetting of emotional words in dysphoria. The study replicated experiment two, but used emotional (i.e. positive and depression-relevant) words instead of neutral words. The study found that dysphoric individuals were still impaired in their ability to suppress emotional material. Furthermore, dysphoric individuals were recalling significantly more depression relevant respond and previously-suppressed words. The fourth experiment examined the role of executive control in intentional forgetting. In the study, dysphoric and non dysphoric participants were categorised as having good or poor executive control based on their scores on the operation span with words task (OSPAN). The study found that non-dysphoric individuals with good control demonstrated successful suppression. However, dysphoric individuals with good control were unsuccessful at suppression. The fifth experiment investigated whether experimentally induced changes in mood state would alter an individual's ability to intentionally forget emotional material. Non-dysphoric healthy participants were given a positive or negative autobiographical memory and music mood induction. They completed two modified think/no-think tasks, one prior to the mood induction and one after the mood induction. The study found that transient negative mood state impaired intentional forgetting of depression-relevant material. Summary: Taken together, the findings suggest that individuals in a depressed mood are impaired in their ability to intentionally forget emotional material, even with the use of a thought substitution strategy. Furthermore, the findings implicate poor executive control and negative mood state in impaired intentional forgetting. An important theme emerging from the findings was the role of an inhibitory mechanism in intentional forgetting. The findings reported in this thesis suggest that thought substitution involves engaging an inhibitory control mechanism that contributes to successful intentional forgetting. The findings have clear implications on depressed individuals everyday functioning, and suggest that even with the presence of effective distraction, dysphoric indivduals are imapired in their ability to suppress emotional material. Furthermore, it is suggested that impaired intentional forgetting of emotional material may contribute to the maintenance of depressed mood, and could potentially worsen ongoing depression.
Resumo:
Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them-that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Resumo:
Because memories are not always accurate, people rely on a variety of strategies to verify whether the events that they remember really did occur. Several studies have examined which strategies people tend to use, but none to date has asked why people opt for certain strategies over others. Here we examined the extent to which people's beliefs about the reliability and the cost of different strategies would determine their strategy selection. Subjects described a childhood memory and then suggested strategies they might use to verify the accuracy of that memory. Next, they rated the reliability and cost of each strategy, and the likelihood that they might use it. Reliability and cost each predicted strategy selection, but a combination of the two ratings provided even greater predictive value. Cost was significantly more influential than reliability, which suggests that a tendency to seek and to value "cheap" information more than reliable information could underlie many real-world memory errors. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Resumo:
A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs. © 2012 Clark et al.
Resumo:
In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings. © 2009 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.