The cost of sin:the effect of social norms on audit pricing

In this paper we provide evidence for the effects of social norms on audit pricing by studying companies belonging to the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries,which are often described as “sin” companies. We hypothesize that the disparities between “sin” firms operations and prevailing social norms create an adverse context which heightens the client's business risk assessment by auditors and is, thereby, reflected in the pricing decisions for audit and consulting services. Having controlled for the impact of variables relating to client attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes, we demonstrate that audit firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. Additionally,we show that audit pricing levels within the “sin” group depend both on prevailing political views and on the level of “vice” exhibited by “sin” companies.

An empirical investigation of audit pricing in the public sector:the case of Greek LGOs

This paper investigates the associations between audit pricing and multidimensional characteristics of local governments by using a sample of Greek municipalities. The Greek institutional setting is interesting because it is politically pluralistic. Moreover, independent auditors appointed through a bid process exclusively perform the audits. Our results suggest a considerable variation on audit fees which is mainly driven by politically related factors indicating the importance of relevant theoretical anticipations in audit pricing in the public sector. Agency costs appear strong enough to explain audit pricing. We also confirm prior findings on the significance of audit complexity and size. Results also suggest that audit fees are reduced when an internal team dedicated to accrual accounting is appointed. Therefore, our conclusions offer practical implications for policy setters and regulators in the public sector in relation to audit quality.

Big 4 audit fee premiums for national and office-level industry leadership in the United Kingdom

The pricing of Big 4 industry leadership Is examined for a sample of U.K. publicly-listed companies, and adds to the evidence from the Australian and U.S. audit markets that city-specific industry leadership commands a fee premium. There is a significant fee premium for city-specific industry leaders relative to other Big 4 auditors, but no evidence that either the top-ranked or second-ranked firm nationally commands a fee premium relative to other Big 4 auditors, after controlling for city-level industry leadership. We also test for Big 4 fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors and the U.K. data suggest a three-level hierarchy based on audit fee differentials: (1) Big 4 city-specific industry leaders have the largest fees; (2) other Big 4 auditors (noncity leaders) and second-tier national firms have comparable fees that are lower than Big 4 city leaders but larger than third-tier firms; and (3) third-tier accounting firms have the lowest fees.

Audit fees, non-audit fees and auditor going-concern reporting decisions in the United Kingdom

The accounting profession has come under increased scrutiny over recent years about the growing number of non-audit fees received from audit clients and the possible negative impact of such fees on auditor independence. The argument advanced is that providing substantial amounts of non-audit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors concede to the wishes of the client management when difficult judgments are made. Such concerns are particularly salient in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients. This study empirically examines audit reports provided to financially stressed companies in the United Kingdom and the magnitude of audit and non-audit service fees paid to the company’s auditors. We find that the magnitude of both audit fees and non-audit fees are significantly associated with the issuance of a going-concern modified audit opinion. In particular, financially stressed companies with high audit fees are more likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion, whereas companies with high non-audit fees are less likely to receive a goingconcern modified audit opinion. Additional analyses indicate that the results are generally robust across alternative model and variable specifications. Overall, evidence supports the contention that high non-audit fees have a detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments for financially stressed U.K. companies.

Auditor's engagement risk and audit fees:the role of the audit firm alumni

This study explores the effect of the association of audit firm alumni with their alma mater on audit prices. The tests indicate that there is a moderate reduction of up to 21% in the level of audit fee when alumni (i.e., former employees) of the incumbent audit firm sit on the client board of directors which is consistent with the engagement risk theory. This suggests that there is an 'alumni effect' in the market for audit services. The findings hold only in the large company segment of the market. The results are robust to different model specifications and alternative samples. The sample comprises all executive and non-executive directors who run the UK quoted companies and are simultaneously ICAEW qualified chartered accountants. The study's implications for the accounting profession and the regulators are also discussed. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

An empirical investigation of price competition and industry specialisation in NHS audit services

The NHS audit market is regulated by the Audit Commission (AC) and has unique features. We develop a model for audit fees that includes rigorous analysis of the type of auditor. Poor financial standing does not give rise to higher audit fees. Despite regulation the study supports the existence of a Big Five price premium on the audit fee, but only one firm has a premium. We found no premium due to industry specialisation. The removal of performance audit from AC regulation will require improved audit fee reporting and control.

The market for professional services in Indonesia

This paper reports the results of a study which investigates the market for professional services in Indonesia, a country which has not been investigated in the by audit fee literature prior. A well-developed research model used in the prior literature has also been applied in this study, and the empirical findings suggest broad similarities in the pricing of professional services in Indonesia and other countries previously studied. In addition to extending the results of prior research to a country not previously studied, this paper examines whether the large auditors fee premium documented in other countries exists in Indonesia, especially after the major Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, since then almost all companies in this geographical area exercise tight budget controls. The results suggest that no audit fee premium is accrued to Indonesian Big 5 auditors, in contrast to the large audit firm fee premium documented in many other countries.

External audit in the National Health Service in England and Wales:a study of an oversight body's control of auditor remuneration

In the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales an oversight body, the Audit Commission (AC), defines the scope of the external auditors’ work, appoints the auditors and has oversight of their fees and audit quality. This heavily regulated audit regime mitigates some of the deficiencies observed in high profile corporate failures. Independence, it has been argued, is influenced by the total auditor remuneration paid by the client. In this study we examine total auditor remuneration in a regulated market which seeks to ensure audit independence and audit quality. In particular we undertake rigorous analysis of auditor remuneration by the type of auditor: We place emphasis on the differentiation between private sector firms and the AC’s in-house auditors (District Audit). Individual private audit firms charge premiums (up to 16%) for particular audit work in identified locations, but no premiums were found when we examined total auditor remuneration. The regime appears to permit efficient operation of the audit market while safeguarding both audit independence and standards.