External audit in the National Health Service in England and Wales:a study of an oversight body's control of auditor remuneration

In the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales an oversight body, the Audit Commission (AC), defines the scope of the external auditors’ work, appoints the auditors and has oversight of their fees and audit quality. This heavily regulated audit regime mitigates some of the deficiencies observed in high profile corporate failures. Independence, it has been argued, is influenced by the total auditor remuneration paid by the client. In this study we examine total auditor remuneration in a regulated market which seeks to ensure audit independence and audit quality. In particular we undertake rigorous analysis of auditor remuneration by the type of auditor: We place emphasis on the differentiation between private sector firms and the AC’s in-house auditors (District Audit). Individual private audit firms charge premiums (up to 16%) for particular audit work in identified locations, but no premiums were found when we examined total auditor remuneration. The regime appears to permit efficient operation of the audit market while safeguarding both audit independence and standards.

The global audit profession and the international financial architecture:understanding regulatory relationships at a time of financial crisis

This paper explores how regulatory relationships in the global audit arena are being affected by the current financial crisis. Key policy initiatives and debates are analyzed, along with institutional interactions, in particular between the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), international regulators and the large audit firms. The events are placed in the context of the new international financial architecture which has developed over the last decade. Using the illustrative lens of bank auditing, questions are asked of the nature and status of audit practice and the regulatory arrangements governing such practice. The paper shows the active nature of the regulatory responses to the crisis and the shifting and competing influences among key regulatory and professional participants in the global audit arena. Emphasis is placed on the need for audit researchers to be sensitive to the developing global financial architecture, and its potential implications for the study of audit practice in different national and international contexts.

The cost of sin:the effect of social norms on audit pricing

In this paper we provide evidence for the effects of social norms on audit pricing by studying companies belonging to the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries,which are often described as “sin” companies. We hypothesize that the disparities between “sin” firms operations and prevailing social norms create an adverse context which heightens the client's business risk assessment by auditors and is, thereby, reflected in the pricing decisions for audit and consulting services. Having controlled for the impact of variables relating to client attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes, we demonstrate that audit firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. Additionally,we show that audit pricing levels within the “sin” group depend both on prevailing political views and on the level of “vice” exhibited by “sin” companies.

Related party transactions, corporate governance and accounting quality in Greece

Related Party Transactions (RPTs) have been considered recently in research as a phenomenon which is associated with several financial scandals, shareholder’s wealth expropriation and is used for earnings management (EM) purposes by the reporting entity. This study aimed to: (i) assess the extent of EM and RPTs i Greece; (ii) investigate the association between RPTs and EM; (iii) investigate the association between corporate governance and EM; (iv) investigate the association between corporate governance and RPTs; and (v) investigate the impact of RPTs on Accounting Quality. Greece was selected for this study as it provides a special context due to poor investor protection, high levels of EM and unhealthy financial reporting environment where wealth extraction and EM are more likely. This study examines the relationship between earnings management and RPTs for the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Moreover, it examines the association between earnings management and corporate governance activities. The results show a negative and significant relationship between EM and RPTs. This finding does not support the conclusion that RPTs are necessarily conducted to mask fraud or the extraction of firm resources. The results show that firms audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms are associated with less EM. Additionally, the study investigates the relationship between RPTs and accounting quality. The findings show that that there is no significant difference in accounting quality between RPTs firms and non-RPTs firms. This study contributes to the EM, accounting quality and corporate governance literatures. This research suggests recommendations for researchers, data providers and policy makers on ways to reduce the problems associated with RPTs.

Interactive data in financial reporting:the construction of the non-professional investor

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States and in particular its immediately past chairman, Christopher Cox, has been actively promoting an upgrade of the EDGAR system of disseminating filings. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, "Interactive Data" (SEC, 2006). In October this year the Office of Interactive Disclosure was created(http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-213.htm). The focus of this paper is to examine the way in which the non-professional investor has been constructed by various actors. We examine the manner in which Interactive Data has been sold as the panacea for financial market 'irregularities' by the SEC and others. The academic literature shows almost no evidence of researching non-professional investors in any real sense (Young, 2006). Both this literature and the behaviour of representatives of institutions such as the SEC and FSA appears to find it convenient to construct this class of investor in a particular form and to speak for them. We theorise the activities of the SEC and its chairman in particular over a period of about three years, both following and prior to the 'credit crunch'. Our approach is to examine a selection of the policy documents released by the SEC and other interested parties and the statements made by some of the policy makers and regulators central to the programme to advance the socio-technical project that is constituted by Interactive Data. We adopt insights from ANT and more particularly the sociology of translation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law, 1996, 2002; Law & Singleton, 2005) to show how individuals and regulators have acted as spokespersons for this malleable class of investor. We theorise the processes of accountability to investors and others and in so doing reveal the regulatory bodies taking the regulated for granted. The possible implications of technological developments in digital reporting have been identified also by the CEO's of the six biggest audit firms in a discussion document on the role of accounting information and audit in the future of global capital markets (DiPiazza et al., 2006). The potential for digital reporting enabled through XBRL to "revolutionize the entire company reporting model" (p.16) is discussed and they conclude that the new model "should be driven by the wants of investors and other users of company information,..." (p.17; emphasis in the original). Here rather than examine the somewhat illusive and vexing question of whether adding interactive functionality to 'traditional' reports can achieve the benefits claimed for nonprofessional investors we wish to consider the rhetorical and discursive moves in which the SEC and others have engaged to present such developments as providing clearer reporting and accountability standards and serving the interests of this constructed and largely unknown group - the non-professional investor.

Big 4 audit fee premiums for national and office-level industry leadership in the United Kingdom

The pricing of Big 4 industry leadership Is examined for a sample of U.K. publicly-listed companies, and adds to the evidence from the Australian and U.S. audit markets that city-specific industry leadership commands a fee premium. There is a significant fee premium for city-specific industry leaders relative to other Big 4 auditors, but no evidence that either the top-ranked or second-ranked firm nationally commands a fee premium relative to other Big 4 auditors, after controlling for city-level industry leadership. We also test for Big 4 fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors and the U.K. data suggest a three-level hierarchy based on audit fee differentials: (1) Big 4 city-specific industry leaders have the largest fees; (2) other Big 4 auditors (noncity leaders) and second-tier national firms have comparable fees that are lower than Big 4 city leaders but larger than third-tier firms; and (3) third-tier accounting firms have the lowest fees.

Earnings behaviour of financially distressed firms:The role of institutional ownership

Using a sample of 859 U.S. bankruptcy-filing firms over the period 1986-2004, we examine the earnings behaviour of managers during the distressed period by looking at sources of abnormal accruals prior to the bankruptcy-filing year. Results show that managers of highly distressed firms shift earnings downwards prior to the bankruptcy filing. We test and provide evidence in support of two potential contributing factors. First, top-level management turnover among distressed firms leads new managers to earnings bath choices during the distressed period. Second, qualified audit opinions exert pressure on managers to follow more conservative earnings behaviour during the distressed period. Evidence is also provided that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional ownership has greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards. Results also show that higher institutional ownership mitigates the negative abnormal returns of firms with top management turnover. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to examine whether institutional ownership relates to market reaction in conjunction with a top management turnover or a qualified audit opinion during the distressed period. Prior studies focused on the investigation of earnings management or institutional ownership (separately) during the distressed period, but did not examine if the effect of institutional ownership on earnings behaviour also influences subsequent returns. Thus, the results of this study should be of interest to analysts, standard setters and regulatory bodies since our results show that management turnover, qualified audit opinions and firm governance mechanisms affect the quality of earnings and the level of abnormal returns. © 2007 Accounting Foundation, The University of Sydney.

Managerial discretion in distressed firms

This study examines the earnings management behaviour of 455 distressed US firms that filed for bankruptcy during the period 1986-2001. We examine (a) possible earnings management during the years prior to bankruptcy-filing, (b) whether qualified audit opinions cause conservative earnings management behaviour, (c) whether earnings management differs between firms that discontinued operations and firms that survived thereafter, and (d) the effect of earnings management on subsequent stock returns. Our results are consistent with downwards earnings management 1 year prior to the bankruptcy-filing. Results also show that (a) firms receiving unqualified audit opinions 4 or 5 years prior to the bankruptcy-filing event manage earnings upwards in subsequent years, consistent with Rosner [2003. Earnings manipulation in failing firms. Contemporary Accounting Research 20, 361-408], (b) more conservative earnings management seems to be related to the qualified audit opinions rendered in the preceding year, (c) firms with long-term negative accruals the year of bankruptcy-filing have a greater chance to survive thereafter, and (d) more pronounced (negative) earnings management is associated with more negative (next year's) subsequent returns. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Regulating audit beyond the crisis:a critical discussion of the EU green paper

With the European Commission making global leadership claims in the field of audit regulation, the content of its 2010 Green Paper on ‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis’ warrants careful scrutiny. Important issues raised in the Green Paper include regulatory oversight, competition in the audit market, the dangers of having very few firms with the capacity to audit global transnational corporations, professional judgement, innovative audit practices and, last but not least, social responsibility. This article analyses the principal perspectives and assumptions underpinning the construction of the Green Paper. The aims are threefold: to enhance understanding of the contemporary regulatory mindset of the European Commission, contribute to policy debate and inspire future research.