Does ownership always matter? Evidence from the Indian banking industry

Existing empirical evidence on the ownership-performance issue is weighted towards the property rights hypothesis that private enterprises are superior to public enterprises. However, very few studies examine a developing country in which the strong link between the market for corporate control and the efficiency of private enterprises assumed by the property rights hypothesis may not be satisfied. Our study of the Indian banking industry confirms our expectation that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, there may not be significant differences in the performance of private and public enterprises. Our analysis highlights the importance of creating appropriate institutions prior to pursuing privatization in developing countries.

The MISLEM Project : developing meta-level quality indicators for establishing a systematic linkage between educational institutions and the labour market:education, employment and graduate employability: project manual

The MISLEM Project comprised representatives from Higher and Vocational Education in four partner countries, Austria, Romania, Slovenia and the UK. In addition to this, representatives from a major UK graduate employment agency and the Austria Quality Assurance Agency were also involved. At the inaugural meeting of the Project, partner teams discussed and agreed upon appropriate methodological processes with which to carry the Project forward.

Institutions and equity structure of foreign affiliates

Question/Issue: We combine agency and institutional theory to explain the division of equity shares between the foreign (majority) and local (minority) partners within foreign affiliates. We posit that once the decision to invest is made, the ownership structure is arranged so as to generate appropriate incentives to local partners, taking into account both the institutional environment and the firm-specific difficulty in monitoring. Research Findings/Insights: Using a large firm-level dataset for the period 2003-2011 from 16 Central and Eastern European countries and applying selectivity corrected estimates, we find that both weaker host country institutions and higher share of intangible assets in total assets in the firm imply higher minority equity share of local partners. The findings hold when controlling for host country effects and when the attributes of the institutional environment are instrumented. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The classic view is that weak institutions lead to concentrated ownership, yet it leaves the level of minority equity shares unexplained. Our contribution uses a firm-level perspective combined with national-level variation in the institutional environment, and applies agency theory to explain the minority local partner share in foreign affiliates. In particular, we posit that the information asymmetry and monitoring problem in firms are exacerbated by weak host country institutions, but also by the higher share of intangible assets in total assets. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Assessing investment opportunities abroad, foreign firms need to pay attention not only to features directly related to corporate governance (e.g., bankruptcy codes) but also to the broad institutional environment. In weak institutional environments, foreign parent firms need to create strong incentives for local partners by offering them significant minority shares in equity. The same recommendation applies to firms with higher shares of intangible assets in total assets. © 2014 The Authors.