2 resultados para Working poor

em Aston University Research Archive


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Purpose - To test a moderated mediation model where a positive relationship between subordinates’ perceptions of a dangerous world—the extent to which an individual views the world as a dangerous place—and supervisory abuse is mediated by their submission to authority figures, and that this relationship is heightened for more poorly performing employees. Design/Methodology/Approach - Data were obtained from 173 subordinates and 45 supervisors working in different private sector organizations in Pakistan. Findings - Our model was supported. It appears that subordinates’ dangerous worldviews are positively associated with their perceptions of abusive supervision and that this is because such views are likely to lead to greater submission to authority figures. But this is only for those employees who are performing more poorly. Implications - We highlight the possibility that individual differences (worldviews, attitudes to authority figures, and performance levels) may lead employees to become victims of abusive supervision. As such, our research informs organizations on how they may better support supervisors in managing effectively their subordinate relationships and, in particular, subordinate poor performance. Originality/Value - We add to recent work exploring subordinate-focused antecedents of abusive supervision, finding support for the salience of the previously untested constructs of individual worldviews, authoritarian submission, and individual job performance. In so doing we also extend research on dangerous worldviews into a new organizational setting. Finally, our research takes place within a new Pakistani context, adding to the burgeoning non-US based body of empirical work into the antecedents and consequences of abusive supervision.

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The delegation of public tasks to arm’s-length bodies remains a central feature of contemporary reform agendas within both developed and developing countries. The role and capacity of political and administrative principals (i.e. ministers and departments of state) to control the vast network of arm’s-length bodies for which they are formally responsible is therefore a critical issue within and beyond academe. In the run-up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom, the ‘quango conundrum’ emerged as an important theme and all three major parties committed themselves to shift the balance of power back towards ministers and sponsor departments. This article presents the results of the first major research project to track and examine the subsequent reform process. It reveals a stark shift in internal control relationships from the pre-election ‘poor parenting’ model to a far tighter internal situation that is now the focus of complaints by arm’s-length bodies of micro-management. This shift in the balance of power and how it was achieved offers new insights into the interplay between different forms of governance and has significant theoretical and comparative relevance. Points for practitioners: For professionals working in the field of arm’s-length governance, the article offers three key insights. First, that a well-resourced core executive is critical to directing reform given the challenges of implementing reform in a context of austerity. Second, that those implementing reform will also need to take into account the diverse consequences of centrally imposed reform likely to result in different departments with different approaches to arm’s-length governance. Third, that reforming arm’s-length governance can affect the quality of relationships, and those working in the field will need to mitigate these less tangible challenges to ensure success.