Noise and the trading mechanism:the case of SETS

On 20 October 1997 the London Stock Exchange introduced a new trading system called SETS. This system was to replace the dealer system SEAQ, which had been in operation since 1986. Using the iterative sum of squares test introduced by Inclan and Tiao (1994), we investigate whether there was a change in the unconditional variance of opening and closing returns, at the time SETS was introduced. We show that for the FTSE-100 stocks traded on SETS, on the days following its introduction, there was a widespread increase in the volatility of both opening and closing returns. However, no synchronous volatility changes were found to be associated with the FTSE-100 index or FTSE-250 stocks. We conclude therefore that the introduction of the SETS trading mechanism caused an increase in noise at the time the system was introduced.

Efficiency and the trading system:The case of SETSmm

This paper studies the impact that a change from a dealer system to a market-maker supported auction system has on market quality. We study the impact that the introduction of SETSmm at the London Stock Exchange had on firm value, price efficiency and liquidity. We discover a small SETSmm return premium associated with the announcement that securities are to migrate to the new trading system. Moreover, securities that migrate to SETSmm are characterized by improvements to liquidity and pricing efficiency. We find that these changes are related to the return premium.

The effects of non-trading on the illiquidity ratio

Using a simulation analysis we show that non-trading can cause an overstatement of the observed illiquidity ratio. Our paper shows how this overstatement can be eliminated with a very simple adjustment to the Amihud illiquidity ratio. We find that the adjustment improves the relationship between the illiquidity ratio and measures of illiquidity calculated from transaction data. Asset pricing tests show that without the adjustment, illiquidity premia estimates can be understated by more than 17% for NYSE securities and by more than 24% for NASDAQ securities.