Approaches to issues of job regulation. A study at branch level in a white collar, public sector trade union. Available in 2 volumes.

This study examines the internal dynamics of white collar trade union branches in the public sector. The effects of a number of internal and external factors on branch patterns of action are evaluated. For the purposes of the study branch action is taken to be the approach to issues of job regulation, as expressed along the five dimensions of dependence on the outside trade union, focus in issues adopted, initiation of issues, intensity of action in issue pursuit and representativeness. The setting chosen for the study is four branches drawn from the same geographical area of the National and Local Government Officers Association. Branches were selected to give a variety in industry settings while controlling for the potentially influential variables of branch size, density of trade union membership and possession of exclusive representational rights in the employing organisation. Identical methods of data collection were used for each branch. The principal findings of the study are that the framework of national agreements and industry collective bargaining structures are strongly related to the industrial relations climate in the employing organisation and the structures of representation within the branch. Where agreements and collective bargaining structures formally restrict branch job regulation roles, there is a degree of devolution of bargaining authority from branch level negotiators to autonomous shop stewards at workplace level. In these circumstances industrial relations climate is characterised by a degree of informality in relationships between management and trade union activists. In turn, industrial relations climate and representative structures together with actor attitudes, have strong effects on all dimensions of approach to issues of job regulation.

Food colours:a study of the effects of regulation

In the 1960s the benefits of government regulation of technology were believed to outweigh any costs. But recent studies have claimed that regulation has negative effects on innovation, health and consumer choice. This case study on food colours examines such claims. EFFECTS ON HEALTH were measured by allocating a hazard rating to each colour. The negative list of 1925 removed three harmful colours which were rapidly replaced, so the benefits were short-lived. Had a proposed ban been adopted in the 1860s it would have prevented many years exposure to hazardous mineral colours. The positive list of 1957 reduced the proportion of harmful coal tar dyes from 54% of the total to 20%. Regulations brought a greater reduction in hazard levels than voluntary trade action. Delays in the introduction of a positive list created a significant hazard burden. EFFECTS ON INNOVATION were assessed from patents and discovery dates. Until the 1950s food colours were adopted from textile colours. The major period of innovation for coal tar colours was between 1856 and 1910, finishing well before regulations were made in 1957, so regulations cannot be blamed for the decline. Regulations appear to have spurred the development of at least one new coal tar dye, and many new plant colours, creating a new sector of the dye industry. EFFECTS ON CONSUMER CHOICE were assessed by case studies. Coloured milk, for example, was banned despite its popularity. Regulations have restricted choice, but have removed from the market foods that were nutritionally impoverished and poor value for money. Compositional regulations provided health protection because they reduced total exposure to colours from certain staple foods. Restricting colours to a smaller range of foods would be an effective way of coping with problems of quality and imperfect toxicological knowledge today.

Trade marks, registered designs and the monopolisation of functional shapes:a consideration of Lego and Dyson

Legislation: Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs art.3(3)(e) Directive 98/71 on the legal protection of designs art.7(1) Cases: Dyson Ltd v Vax Ltd [2010] EWHC 1923 (Pat); [2011] Bus. L.R. 232 (Ch D (Patents Ct)) Lego Juris A/S v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-48/09 P) Unreported September 14, 2010 (ECJ) *E.I.P.R. 60 In Lego, the Court of Justice of the European Union denied registration for an exclusively functional shape mark despite the availability of other shapes capable of fulfilling the same function and in Dyson v Vax Mr Justice Arnold established that a design can not be registered for a purely functional shape even though another shape could fulfil the same required function.

"Trade creep" and implications of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement for the United Kingdom National Health Service

The ambitious and comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP/TAFTA) agreement between the European Union and United States is now being negotiated and may have far-reaching consequences for health services. The agreement extends to government procurement, investment, and further regulatory cooperation. In this article, we focus on the United Kingdom National Health Service and how these negotiations can limit policy space to change policies and to regulate in relation to health services, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and health industries. The negotiation of TTIP/TAFTA has the potential to "harmonize" more corporate-friendly regulation, resulting in higher costs and loss of policy space, an example of "trade creep" that potentially compromises health equity, public health, and safety concerns across the Atlantic.

International trade law, plain packaging and tobacco industry political activity:the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Tobacco companies are increasingly turning to trade and investment agreements to challenge measures aimed at reducing tobacco use. This study examines their efforts to influence the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a major trade and investment agreement which may eventually cover 40% of the world's population; focusing on how these efforts might enhance the industry's power to challenge the introduction of plain packaging. Specifically, the paper discusses the implications for public health regulation of Philip Morris International's interest in using the TPP to: shape the bureaucratic structures and decision-making processes of business regulation at the national level; introduce a higher standard of protection for trademarks than is currently provided under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and expand the coverage of Investor-State Dispute Settlement which empowers corporations to litigate directly against governments where they are deemed to be in breach of investment agreements. The large number of countries involved in the TPP underlines its risk to the development of tobacco regulation globally.