13 resultados para Taxation and government property
em Aston University Research Archive
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Central aspects of new regime for taxation of intangible assets introduced by FA 2002 which seeks to align tax treatment with accounting treatment of intellectual property
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Audit accountability and government, Fidelma White and Kathryn Hollingsworth, Claredon Press, 1999. 221 pp. £45.00
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This paper analyses corporate and government strategies during the purchase, period of control and divestment by BMW of the car manufacturer Rover over the period 1994 to 2000. This paper examines three types of ‘failure’. It views BMW’s purchase of Rover as a ‘corporate failure’, with British Aerospace keen to sell Rover to raise cash and with BMW not realising the real condition of Rover. It then moves on to examine BMW’s ‘divide and rule’ strategies with regard to working conditions and subsidy-seeking and its decision to sell Rover as an example of ‘strategic failure’. Finally, it considers the ‘hands-off’ nature of British policy towards such transnational firms, and BMW in particular, as an example of ‘government failure’. This paper concludes by raising the possibility of an EU-wide policy towards transnationals, especially in terms of monitoring the activities of such firms.
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Puts the case for reform of the law to allow for the administration of the estate of a missing person in the interim period between their disappearance and any later declaration of their presumed of death. Explains why reform is needed. Notes Parliamentary activities relating to the presumption of death and interim administration in the period 2008-12. Highlights Australian and Canadian legislation providing for such interim administration and the Irish Law Commission recommendations for a statutory scheme on administering a missing person's property.
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As property lawyers, we are all familiar with the general principle that a contract for the sale of land, which is capable of specific performance, operates in equity so as to confer a trust on the purchaser pending completion of the sale. Although some controversy exists as to the exact nature of the trust, it is well established that, upon exchange of contracts, equity will ‘‘treat that as done which ought to be done’’1 with the consequence that the purchaser acquires equitable ownership even though full (legal) title to the land will not pass until completion (and registration). As land is unique, specific performance is readily available in the context of sales of land where damages would, clearly, not be an adequate remedy. The same cannot be said for contracts for the purchase of personal property where invariably the subject matter is not unique and where a substitute can easily be acquired in the open market. In circumstances, however, where the property is unique or scarce (for example, a rare painting or vintage car), the maxim that ‘‘equity treats as done that which ought to be done’’ may be invoked so as to confer on the seller an equitable obligation to transfer the property to the purchaser in fulfilment of the contract. Where, therefore, the contract is specifically enforceable in this way, the seller, it is submitted, will again hold the property on trust for the purchaser where, as in a contract for the sale of land, there is an interval between the date of the contract and completion of the sale. The notion that a seller holds personal property upon trust for the purchaser pending completion of the sale is admittedly controversial, but this article seeks to argue that the same principles governing equity’s intervention in sales of land should apply in the context of sales of personalty. It is submitted that equity’s role in imposing a trust on the vendor both in relation to sales of land and personalty may be important in safeguarding the interests of the purchaser prior to, as well as after, completion of the transaction.
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This paper analyses the relationship between innovation - proxied by Research and Development (R&D), patent and trade mark activity – and profitability in a panel of Australian firms (1995 to 1998). Special attention is given to assessing the nature of competitive conditions faced by different firms, as the nature of competition is likely to affect the returns to innovation. The hypothesis is that lower levels of competition will imply higher returns to innovation. To allow for a time lag time before any return to innovation, the market value of the firms is used as a proxy for expected future profits. The results give some support for the main hypothesis: the market’s valuation of R&D activity is higher in industries where competition is lower. However, the paper highlights the difficulty in assessing competitive conditions and finds a number of results that challenge the simple hypothesis.
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This paper considers the value of innovation to large Australian firms. Specifically, we investigate how R&D and intellectual property activity influences the market value of firms, using a Tobin’s q approach. R&D data are available for the period 1994–96 and data on patent, trade mark and design applications for 1996. The findings suggest that R&D and patent activity are positively and significantly associated with market value. The results also suggest that private returns to R&D in Australia are low by international standards.
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One of the unresolved issues concerning equity’s jurisdiction to set aside dispositions for mistake is the nature of the proprietary consequences that ensue. The decision in Bainbridge v Bainbridge sheds further light on this important issue, but also illustrates that some important aspects concerning the application of rescission needs further clarification. The key issue concerned the rescission of a trust, where parts of the land had been sold by the trustees who had used the proceeds of sale to buy two new plots of land. Part of the reasoning used by Master Matthews relied upon authorities, developed in the context of fraudulently induced transfers of money, which requires careful consideration of the relationship between the principle in Pitt v Holt and unjust enrichment.
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FDI plays a key role in development, particularly in resource-constrained transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe with relatively low savings rates. Gains from technology transfer play a critical role in motivating FDI, yet potential for it may be hampered by a large technology gap between the source and host country. While the extent of this gap has traditionally been attributed to education, skills and capital intensity, recent literature has also emphasized the possible role of institutional environment in this respect. Despite tremendous interest among policy-makers and academics to understand the factors attracting FDI (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) our knowledge about the effects of institutions on the location choice and ownership structure of foreign firms remains limited. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining the link between institutions and foreign ownership structures. To the best of our knowledge, Javorcik (2004) is the only papers, which use firm-level data to analyse the role of institutional quality on an outward investor’s entry mode in transition countries. Our paper extends Javorcik (2004) in a number of ways: (a) rather than a cross-section, we use panel data for the period 1997-2006; (b) rather than a binary variable, we use the percentage foreign ownership as continuous variable; (c) we consider multi-dimensional institutional variables, such as corruption, intellectual property rights protection and government stability. We also use factor analysis to generate a composite index of institutional quality and see how stronger institutional environment could affect foreign ownership; (d) we explore how the distance between institutional environment in source and host countries affect foreign ownership in a host country. The firm-level data used includes both domestic and foreign firms for the period 1997-2006 and is drawn from ORBIS, a commercially available dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. In order to examine the link between institutions and foreign ownership structures, we estimate four log-linear ownership equations/specifications augmented by institutional and other control variables. We find evidence that the decision of a foreign firm to either locate its subsidiary or acquire an existing domestic firm depends not only on factor cost differences but also on differences in institutional environment between the host and source countries.
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What drives innovation? How does it contribute to the growth of firms, industries, and economies? And do intellectual property rights help or hurt innovation and growth? Uniquely combining microeconomics, macroeconomics, and theory with empirical analysis drawn from the United States and Europe, this book introduces graduate students and advanced undergraduates to the complex process of innovation. By addressing all the major dimensions of innovation in a single text, Christine Greenhalgh and Mark Rogers are able to show how outcomes at the microlevel feed through to the macro-outcomes that in turn determine personal incomes and job opportunities. In four sections, this textbook comprehensively addresses the nature of innovation and intellectual property, the microeconomics and macroeconomics of innovation, and economic policy at the firm and macroeconomic levels. Among the topics fully explored are the role of intellectual property in creating incentives to innovate; the social returns of innovation; the creation and destruction of jobs by innovation; whether more or fewer intellectual property rights would give firms better incentives to innovate; and the contentious issues surrounding international treaties on intellectual property.
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We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.