Evaluating local strategic partnerships:theory and practice of change

Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) are a major recent innovation in English local governance. As the 'partnership of partnerships' in a locality, the ability of the LSP to provide an arena for community leadership and joined up service delivery is vital to the Local Government Modernisation Agenda. Drawing on material from the national evaluation of LSPs, this paper assesses their progress. A theory of change (ToC) approach was adopted in the evaluation, and the paper shows how this approach was developed and utilised. The main findings from the evaluation are then presented and discussed. In conclusion, the article draws some wider conclusions both about the strengths and weaknesses of the ToC approach and about LSPs themselves.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

Urban governance under neoliberalism:New Labour and the restructuring of state-space

In the UK there has been a proliferation of agencies at differing regulatory scales as part of the rescaling and restructuring of the state by New Labour, following the neoliberal policies of previous Conservative governments. This raises questions concerning the extent to which New Labour's urban state restructuring is embedded within neoliberalism, and the local tensions and contradictions arising from emergent New Labour urban state restructuring. This paper examines these questions through the analysis of key policy features of New Labour, and the in-depth exploration of two programmes that are reshaping urban governance arrangements, namely Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and New Deal for Communities (NDC) programmes. We conclude that New Labour's restructuring is best understood in terms of the extended reproduction (roll-out) of neoliberalism. While these “new institutional fixes” are only weakly established and exhibit internal contradictions and tensions, these have not led to a broader contestation of neoliberalism.

Sub-national responses to climate change in England:evidence from local area agreements

The machinery of governance to address climate change at the sub-national level in England continues to evolve. Drawing on documentary evidence and the views of civil servants and local authority officials from the English West Midlands, this article explores the process through an examination of the inclusion of climate change indicators in the recent round of Local Area Agreements (LAAs), negotiated between central government and local authorities and Local Strategic Partnerships. Considerable popularity has been accorded these indicators nationally, but there are important variations in the pattern of take up. Moreover, significant uncertainties surround the contribution of local measures to reduce CO2 emissions and the targets attached to measures to adapt to climate change are seen as undemanding. Conversely, the impending Carbon Reduction Commitment will act as a powerful incentive for public bodies to cut CO2 emissions from their estates. Although potentially contributing to greater coherence in tackling climate change, achieving collective action through LAAs will prove problematic.

Climate change performance measurement, control and accountability in English local areas

Purpose – This paper aims to consider how climate change performance is measured and accounted for within the performance framework for local authority areas in England adopted in 2008. It critically evaluates the design of two mitigation and one adaptation indicators that are most relevant to climate change. Further, the potential for these performance indicators to contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation is discussed. Design/methodology/approach – The authors begin by examining the importance of the performance framework and the related Local Area Agreements (LAAs), which were negotiated for all local areas in England between central government and Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). This development is located within the broader literature relating to new public management. The potential for this framework to assist in delivering the UK's climate change policy objectives is researched in a two-stage process. First, government publications and all 150 LAAs were analysed to identify the level of priority given to the climate change indicators. Second, interviews were conducted in spring 2009 with civil servants and local authority officials from the English West Midlands who were engaged in negotiating the climate change content of the LAAs. Findings – Nationally, the authors find that 97 per cent of LAAs included at least one climate change indicator as a priority. The indicators themselves, however, are perceived to be problematic – in terms of appropriateness, accuracy and timeliness. In addition, concerns were identified about the level of local control over the drivers of climate change performance and, therefore, a question is raised as to how LSPs can be held accountable for this. On a more positive note, for those concerned about climate change, the authors do find evidence that the inclusion of these indicators within the performance framework has helped to move climate change up the agenda for local authorities and their partners. However, actions by the UK's new coalition government to abolish the national performance framework and substantially reduce public expenditure potentially threaten this advance. Originality/value – This paper offers an insight into a new development for measuring climate change performance at a local level, which is relatively under-researched. It also contributes to knowledge of accountability within a local government setting and provides a reference point for further research into the potential role of local actions to address the issue of climate change.