What May the Sheep safely know?

The relationship of knowledge and liberties in modern societies presents a multitude of fascinating issues that deserve to be explored more systematically. The production of knowledge is dynamic, and the conditions and practice of freedom is undergoing transformation. These changes ensure that the linkages between liberty and knowledge are always subject to changes. In the past, the connection between scientific knowledge, democracy, and emancipation seemed self-evident. More recently, the close linkage between democracy and knowledge has been viewed with skepticism. This volume explores the relationship between knowledge and democracy, Do they support each other, do they mutually depend on each other, or are they perhaps even in conflict with each other? Does knowledge increase the freedom to act? If additional knowledge contributes to individual and social well being, does it also enhance freedoms? Knowledge and Democracy focuses on the interpenetration of knowledge, freedom and democracy, and does so from various perspectives, theoretical as well as practical. Modern societies are transforming themselves into knowledge societies. This has a fundamental impact on political systems and the relationship of citizens to large social institutions. The contributors to this book systemically explore whether, and in what ways, these modern-day changes and developments are connected to expansion of the capacities of individual citizens to act. They focus on the interrelation of democracy and knowledge, and the role of democratic institutions, as well as on the knowledge and social conduct of actors within democratic institutions. In the process of investigation, they arrive at a newplatform for future research and theory, one that is sensitive to present-day societal conflicts, cleavages, and transformations generated by new knowledge.

How checking breeds doubt:reduced performance in a simple working memory task

A paradox of memory research is that repeated checking results in a decrease in memory certainty, memory vividness and confidence [van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003a). Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 369–378; van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003b). Repeated checking causes memory distrust. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 301–316]. Although these findings have been mainly attributed to changes in episodic long-term memory, it has been suggested [Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 313–323] that representations in working memory could already suffer from detrimental checking. In two experiments we set out to test this hypothesis by employing a delayed-match-to-sample working memory task. Letters had to be remembered in their correct locations, a task that was designed to engage the episodic short-term buffer of working memory [Baddeley, A. D. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component in working memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417–423]. Of most importance, we introduced an intermediate distractor question that was prone to induce frustrating and unnecessary checking on trials where no correct answer was possible. Reaction times and confidence ratings on the actual memory test of these trials confirmed the success of this manipulation. Most importantly, high checkers [cf. VOCI; Thordarson, D. S., Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., Shafran, R, Sawchuk, C. N., & Hakstian, A. R. (2004). The Vancouver obsessional compulsive inventory (VOCI). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289–1314] were less accurate than low checkers when frustrating checking was induced, especially if the experimental context actually emphasized the irrelevance of the misleading question. The clinical relevance of this result was substantiated by means of an extreme groups comparison across the two studies. The findings are discussed in the context of detrimental checking and lack of distractor inhibition as a way of weakening fragile bindings within the episodic short-term buffer of Baddeley's (2000) model. Clinical implications, limitations and future research are considered.