Congestion pricing by priority auction

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

Making energy service companies (ESCOS) future fit

Energy service companies (ESCOs) are faced with a range of challenges and opportunities associated with the rapidly changing and flexible requirements of energy customers (end users) and rapid improvements in technologies associated with energy and ICT. These opportunities for innovation include better prediction of energy demand, transparency of data to the end user, flexible and time dependent energy pricing and a range of novel finance models. The liberalisation of energy markets across the world has leads to a very small price differential between suppliers on the unit cost of energy. Energy companies are therefore looking to add additional layers of value using service models borrowed from the manufacturing industry. This opens a range of new product and service offerings to energy markets and consumers and has implications for the overall efficiency, utility and price of energy provision.