Copyright law as a matter of (inter)national security? – The attempt to securitise commercial infringement and its spill-over onto individual liability

This article evaluates the way in which copyright infringement has been gradually shifting from an area of civil liability to one of criminal penalty. Traditionally, consideration of copyright issues has been undertaken from a predominantly legal and/or economic perspectives. Whereas traditional legal analysis can explain what legal changes are occurring, and what impact these changes may have, they may not effectively explain ‘how’ these changes have come to occur. The authors propose an alternative inter-disciplinary approach, combining legal analysis with critical security studies, which may help to explain in greater detail how policies in this field have developed. In particular, through applied securitisation theory, this article intends to demonstrate the appropriation of this field by a security discourse, and its consequences for societal and legal developments. In order to explore how the securitisation framework may be a valid approach to a subject such as copyright law and to determine the extent to which copyright law may be said to have been securitised, this article will begin by explaining the origins and main features of securitisation theory, and its applicability to legal study. The authors will then attempt to apply this framework to the development of a criminal law approach to copyright infringement, by focusing on the security escalation it has undergone, developing from an economic issue into one of international security. The analysis of this evolution will be mainly characterised by the securitisation moves taking place at national, European and international levels. Finally, a general reflection will be carried out on whether the securitisation of copyright has indeed been successful and on what the consequences of such a success could be.

EU governance of the internet:analyzing Europol’s role in the development of a EU cyber crime and cyber security policies

In recent years, the European Union has come to view cyber security, and in particular, cyber crime as one of the most relevant challenges to the completion of its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given European societies’ increased reliance on borderless and decentralized information technologies, this sector of activity has been identified as an easy target for actors such as organised criminals, hacktivists or terrorist networks. Such analysis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the fight against unlawful online activities, namely through increased cooperation among law enforcement authorities (both national and extra- communitarian), the approximation of legislations, and public- private partnerships. Although EU initiatives in this field have, so far, been characterized by a lack of interconnection and an integrated strategy, there has been, since the mid- 2000s, an attempt to develop a more cohesive and coordinated policy. An important part of this policy is connected to the activities of Europol, which have come to assume a central role in the coordination of intelligence gathering and analysis of cyber crime. The European Cybercrime Center (EC3), which will become operational within Europol in January 2013, is regarded, in particular, as a focal point of the EU’s fight against this phenomenon. Bearing this background in mind, the present article wishes to understand the role of Europol in the development of a European policy to counter the illegal use of the internet. The article proposes to reach this objective by analyzing, through the theoretical lenses of experimental governance, the evolution of this agency’s activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, its positioning as an expert in the field, and the consequences for the way this policy is currently developing and is expected to develop in the near future.

Beyond securitisation : Western Mediterranean international relations from a security perspective 1989-2002

Following the end of the Cold War and the ensuing changes to the international landscape, thinking about security has tended to become more discursive and interpretative in nature. What counts as security has increasingly derived from security discourses (that is, 'securitisation') and uncertainty about the multi-faceted future facing various countries and regions. Within this post-Cold War discourse, the Western Mediterranean has emerged as a region fraught with latent and manifest threats in the economic, political, societal and military sectors. Improved access to EU markets for Maghrebi exports; the security of energy supplies to the EU from Algeria and Libya; lack of democracy and the advance of political Islam; the flow of northward migration and worries about law and order in France, Italy and Spain; the growth in military expenditure and weapons proliferation in the Maghreb; all have been central to the securitisation agenda. However, this agenda has often lacked credibility especially when inter-linkages have purportedly been established between economic underdevelopment and political instability, between the advance of political Islam and the threat to energy supplies, or between immigration and the threat to national identity. Such inter-sectoral linkages distract from the credibility of those 'securitisation instances' which correspond to reality; the former linkages have often been exploited by extremist politicians in south-west European countries as well as by regimes in the Maghreb to advance their respective interests. Thus, securitisation may defeat its main purpose; it may generate responses out of keeping with the aims proclaimed at the outset, aims centred on the countering of real threats and the ensuring of greater stability.

Safetynet Security Ltd v Coppage 2012

Case law report - online

Tamang v Act Security 2012

Case law report - online

Dialogue, partnership and empowerment for network and information security:the changing role of the private sector from objects of regulation to regulation shapers

The protection of cyberspace has become one of the highest security priorities of governments worldwide. The EU is not an exception in this context, given its rapidly developing cyber security policy. Since the 1990s, we could observe the creation of three broad areas of policy interest: cyber-crime, critical information infrastructures and cyber-defence. One of the main trends transversal to these areas is the importance that the private sector has come to assume within them. In particular in the area of critical information infrastructure protection, the private sector is seen as a key stakeholder, given that it currently operates most infrastructures in this area. As a result of this operative capacity, the private sector has come to be understood as the expert in network and information systems security, whose knowledge is crucial for the regulation of the field. Adopting a Regulatory Capitalism framework, complemented by insights from Network Governance, we can identify the shifting role of the private sector in this field from one of a victim in need of protection in the first phase, to a commercial actor bearing responsibility for ensuring network resilience in the second, to an active policy shaper in the third, participating in the regulation of NIS by providing technical expertise. By drawing insights from the above-mentioned frameworks, we can better understand how private actors are involved in shaping regulatory responses, as well as why they have been incorporated into these regulatory networks.

Private security beyond private military and security companies:exploring diversity within private-public collaborations and its consequences for security governance

The aim of this special issue is to widen the existing debates on security privatization by looking at how and why an increasing number of private actors beyond private military and/or security companies (PMSCs) have come to perform various security related functions. While PMSCs produce security for profit, most other private sector actors make profit by selling goods and services that were originally not connected with security in the traditional understanding of the term. However, due to the continuous introduction of new legal and technical regulations by public authorities, many non- security related private businesses nowadays have to perform at least some security functions. Little research, however, has been done thus far, both in terms of security practices of non- security related private businesses and their impact on security governance. This introduction explains how this special issue contributes to closing this glaring gap by 1) extending the conceptual and theoretical arguments in the existing body of literature; and 2) offering a range of original case studies on the specific roles of non- security related private companies of all sizes, areas of businesses, and geographic origin.