Examining a key aspect of agency-to-business relationships:the effects of regulatory control on the satisfaction of regulated firms

This paper studies an overlooked, but highly important relationship, the relationship that exists between regulatory agencies (e.g., the EPA, OSHA, and the FDA) and the for-profit businesses they attempt to govern. Drawing on business-to-business control and satisfaction research, a framework is developed to understand how regulatory control influences the satisfaction levels of customer firms. Regulatory control is disaggregated into four distinct facets: the controlling agency, the rules and regulations of control, the processes used by the agency to apply the regulations, and sanctions. Each facet is hypothesized to have an effect on satisfaction. A regulator's administration of state food safety regulations provides the empirical context for testing the hypotheses. Results from a survey of 173 restaurants provide empirical support for the conceptual model. Most importantly, the study finds that the informal control process increases customer satisfaction, while the formal control process decreases customer satisfaction. We discuss how these and other findings may contribute to more effective agency-to-business relationships and ongoing research.

Hierarchical control and performance regimes in local government

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider hierarchical control as a mode of governance, and analyses the extent of control exhibited by central government over local government through the best value (BV) and comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) performance regimes. Design/methodology/approach – This paper utilises Ouchi's framework and, specifically, his articulation of bureaucratic or hierarchical control in the move towards achievement of organisational objectives. Hierarchical control may be inferred from the extent of “command and control” by Central Government, use of rewards and sanctions, and alignment to government priorities and discrimination of performance. Findings – CPA represents a more sophisticated performance regime than BV in the governance of local authorities by central government. In comparison to BV, CPA involved less scope for dialogue with local government prior to introduction, closer inspection of and direction of support toward poorer performing authorities, and more alignment to government priorities in the weightings attached to service blocks. Originality/value - The paper focuses upon the hierarchic/bureaucratic mode of governance as articulated by Ouchi and expands on this mode in order to analyse shifts in performance regimes in the public sector.