CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

The real effects of banking supervision:evidence from enforcement actions

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

The strategic role of relational capabilities in the business-to-business service profit chain

This paper extends the original service profit chain by examining the role of relational capabilities with employees, customers and strategic partners on process and performance outcomes in a business-to-business context. More specifically, we demonstrate how satisfied and loyal employees are better in developing relationships with customers and strategic partners. These relationships enable firms to be more responsive towards customers and become more innovative, which increase customer satisfaction and loyalty and, ultimately, financial performance. Our results provide support for the development of relational capabilities in a business-to-business environment by extending the service profit chain (SPC) model. However, we find that while the development of strong customer relationships contributes to an improved service responsiveness of the firm, strategic partners do not.