The 'hard problem' and the quantum physicists. Part 1:the first generation

All four of the most important figures in the early twentieth-century development of quantum physics-Niels Bohr, Erwin Schroedinger, Werner Heisenberg and Wolfgang Pauli-had strong interests in the traditional mind-brain, or 'hard,' problem. This paper reviews their approach to this problem, showing the influence of Bohr's complementarity thesis, the significance of Schroedinger's small book, 'What is life?,' the updated Platonism of Heisenberg and, perhaps most interesting of all, the interaction of Carl Jung and Wolfgang Pauli in the latter's search for a unification of mind and matter. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Synapses, quantum theory and panpsychism

The introduction situates the ‘hard problem’ in its historical context and argues that the problem has two sides: the output side (the Kant-Eccles problem of the freedom of the Will) and the input side (the problem of qualia). The output side ultimately reduces to whether quantum mechanics can affect the operation of synapses. A discussion of the detailed molecular biology of synaptic transmission as presently understood suggests that such affects are unlikely. Instead an evolutionary argument is presented which suggests that our conviction of free agency is an evolutionarily induced illusion and hence that the Kant-Eccles problem is itself illusory. This conclusion is supported by well-known neurophysiology. The input side, the problem of qualia, of subjectivity, is not so easily outflanked. After a brief review of the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness (NCC) and of the Penrose-Hameroff microtubular neuroquantology it is again concluded that the molecular neurobiology makes quantum wave-mechanics an unlikely explanation. Instead recourse is made to an evolutionarily- and neurobiologically-informed panpsychism. The notion of an ‘emergent’ property is carefully distinguished from that of the more usual ‘system’ property used by most dual-aspect theorists (and the majority of neuroscientists) and used to support Llinas’ concept of an ‘oneiric’ consciousness continuously modified by sensory input. I conclude that a panpsychist theory, such as this, coupled with the non-classical understanding of matter flowing from quantum physics (both epistemological and scientific) may be the default and only solution to the problem posed by the presence of mind in a world of things.

The 'hard problem' and the quantum physicists. Part 2: modern times

This is the second part of a review of the work of quantum physicists on the ‘hard part’ of the problem of mind. After an introduction which sets the scene and a brief review of contemporary work on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) the work of four prominent modern investigators is examined: J.C. Eccles/Friedrich Beck; Henry Stapp; Stuart Hameroff/Roger Penrose; David Bohm. With the exception of David Bohm, all attempt to show where in the brain’s microstructure quantum affects could make themselves felt. It is reluctantly concluded that none have neurobiological plausibility. They are all instances, to paraphrase T.H. Huxley, of a beautiful hypothesis destroyed by ugly facts. David Bohm does not attempt to fit his new quantum physics to contemporary neurobiology but instead asks for a radical rethink of our conventional scientific paradigm. He suggests that we should look towards developing a ‘pan-experientialism’ or ‘dual-aspect monism’ where consciousness goes ‘all the way down’ and that the ‘hard problem’ is not soluble within the framework of ideas provided by ‘classical’ natural science.