Lead time reduction for new products

The research, which was given the terms of reference, "To cut the lead time for getting new products into volume production", was sponsored by a company which develops and manufactures telecommunications equipment. The research described was based on studies made of the development of two processors which were designed to control telephone exchanges in the public network. It was shown that for each of these products, which were large electronic systems containing both hardware and software, most of their lead time was taken up with development. About half of this time was consumed by activities associated with redesign resulting from changes found to be necessary after the original design had been built. Analysing the causes of design changes showed the most significant to be Design Faults. The reasons why these predominated were investigated by seeking the collective opinion from design staff and their management using a questionnaire. Using the results from these studies to build upon the works of other authors, a model of the development process of large hierarchical systems is derived. An important feature of this model is its representation of iterative loops due to design changes. In order to reduce the development time, two closely related philosophies are proposed: By spending more time at the early stages of development (detecting and remedying faults in the design) even greater savings can be made later on, The collective performance of the development organisation would be improved by increasing the amount and speed of feedback about that performance. A trial was performed to test these philosophies using readily available techniques for design verification. It showed that about an 11 per cent saving would be made on the development time and that the philosophies might be equally successfully applied to other products and techniques.

An approach to the development of expert systems within production planning and control

The thesis presents an account of an attempt to utilize expert systems within the domain of production planning and control. The use of expert systems was proposed due to the problematical nature of a particular function within British Steel Strip Products' Operations Department: the function of Order Allocation, allocating customer orders to a production week and site. Approaches to tackling problems within production planning and control are reviewed, as are the general capabilities of expert systems. The conclusions drawn are that the domain of production planning and control contains both `soft' and `hard' problems, and that while expert systems appear to be a useful technology for this domain, this usefulness has by no means yet been demonstrated. Also, it is argued that the main stream methodology for developing expert systems is unsuited for the domain. A problem-driven approach is developed and used to tackle the Order Allocation function. The resulting system, UAAMS, contained two expert components. One of these, the scheduling procedure was not fully implemented due to inadequate software. The second expert component, the product routing procedure, was untroubled by such difficulties, though it was unusable on its own; thus a second system was developed. This system, MICRO-X10, duplicated the function of X10, a complex database query routine used daily by Order Allocation. A prototype version of MICRO-X10 proved too slow to be useful but allowed implementation and maintenance issues to be analysed. In conclusion, the usefulness of the problem-driven approach to expert systems development within production planning and control is demonstrated but restrictions imposed by current expert system software are highlighted in that the abilities of such software to cope with `hard' scheduling constructs and also the slow processing speeds of such software can restrict the current usefulness of expert systems within production planning and control.

Modular system design and control for flexible assembly

Flexible Assembly Systems (FASs) are normally associated with the automatic, or robotic, assembly of products, supported by automated material handling systems. However, manual assembly operations are still prevalent within many industries, where the complexity and variety of products prohibit the development of suitable automated assembly equipment. This article presents a generic model for incorporating flexibility into the design and control of assembly operations concerned with high variety/low volume manufacture, drawing on the principles for Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) and Just-in-Time (JIT) delivery. It is based on work being undertaken in an electronics company where the assembly operations have been overhauled and restructured in response to a need for greater flexibility, shorter cycle times and reduced inventory levels. The principles employed are in themselves not original. However, the way they have been combined and tailored has created a total manufacturing control system which represents a new concept for responding to demands placed on market driven firms operating in an uncertain environment.

The devil is in the detail:tobacco industry political influence in the Dutch implementation of the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive

Introduction - The Dutch implementation of the black border provision in the 2001 European Union Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) is studied to examine the implications of tobacco industry involvement in the implementation phase of the policy process. Methods - A qualitative analysis was conducted of Dutch government documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, triangulated with in-depth interviews with key informants and secondary data sources (publicly available government documents, scientific literature, and news articles). Results - Tobacco manufacturers’ associations were given the opportunity to set implementation specifications via a fast-track deal with the government. The offer of early implementation of the labelling section of the TPD was used as political leverage by the industry, and underpinned by threats of litigation and arguments highlighting the risks of additional public costs and the benefits to the government of expediency and speed. Ultimately, the government agreed to the industry's interpretation, against the advice of the European Commission. Conclusions - The findings highlight the policy risks associated with corporate actors’ ability to use interactions over technical product specifications to influence the implementation of health policy and illustrate the difficulties in limiting industry interference in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The implementation phase is particularly vulnerable to industry influence, where negotiation with industry actors may be unavoidable and the practical implications of relatively technical considerations are not always apparent to policymakers. During the implementation of the new TPD 2014/40/EU, government officials are advised to take a proactive role in stipulating technical specifications.

VGI quality control

This paper presents a framework for considering quality control of volunteered geographic information (VGI). Different issues need to be considered during the conception, acquisition and post-acquisition phases of VGI creation. This includes items such as collecting metadata on the volunteer, providing suitable training, giving corrective feedback during the mapping process and use of control data, among others. Two examples of VGI data collection are then considered with respect to this quality control framework, i.e. VGI data collection by National Mapping Agencies and by the most recent Geo-Wiki tool, a game called Cropland Capture. Although good practices are beginning to emerge, there is still the need for the development and sharing of best practice, especially if VGI is to be integrated with authoritative map products or used for calibration and/or validation of land cover in the future.