Understanding the labour–environmental relationship in Britain, 1967–2011:a new narrative using political opportunity structure and coalition theory

Orthodox depictions of a fraught labour–environmental relationship privileging class, ideological and programmatic differences are problematised by newly quantified evidence of British unions' pro-environmental policy-making since 1967. The following narrative blends widely accepted accounts of the fortunes of both movements with an evaluation of Britain's shifting political opportunity structure and coalition theory to identify an alternative range of constraints and opportunities influencing the propensity and capacity of both movements to interact effectively, culminating recently in unions' emergence as environmental actors in their own right.

From co-operative to competitive localism? The changing balance between equity and efficiency in local government under the Conservative / Liberal Democrat coalition

This paper considers whether there has been a shift in the balance between equity and efficiency in respect of decentralised public policy in England since the election of the Conservative / Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010. Drawing on the literature on policy decentralisation and fiscal federalism from both Political Science and Economics, reasons are discussed why a trade-off between equity and efficiency might be expected. The context of English local government then outlined, and consideration is then given to four areas of policy: business rate localisation, the ‘New Homes Bonus’, council tax benefit and social housing, and regional economic development. In each case, some shift in the balance away from concern with equity towards one with efficiency is discerned: whether or not this is desirable will prove a matter of political and moral, as well as scientific judgement.

Bonfires and barbecues:coalition governance and the politics of Quango reform

The use of arm's-length bodies to deliver certain services, to regulate certain sectors or to assume responsibility for particularly salient political issues is neither new in historical terms or a feature unique to the UK in comparative terms. What is particularly distinctive, however, is the Coalition Government's attempts since 2010 to reduce the number of ‘quangos’ while also strengthening the capacity of the core executive and sponsor departments to control and co-ordinate this dense and fragmented sphere of delegated governance. Drawing upon the findings of the first research project to analyse the current Public Bodies Reform Agenda, this article provides an account of the ‘filling-in’ of the ‘hollowing out’. It argues that when viewed through a historical lens, the Coalition Government has adopted a distinctive approach to ‘the quango problem’.

Did they ‘Read before burning’? The Coalition and quangos

Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be undemocratic, unaccountable organisations, while on the other they are seen to improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in government. This paradox is reflected in the behaviour of political parties, which generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the Conservative party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue ‘a more sophisticated approach’. This article explores the Coalition government's subsequent ‘public bodies reform programme’, assessing its progress against recommendations contained within the Institute for Government's Read before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes that while the Coalition has addressed long-standing concerns about the day-to-day governance of public bodies, it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic (metagovernance) issues.

From ‘poor parenting’ to micro-management:coalition governance and the sponsorship of arm’s-length bodies in the United Kingdom, 2010–13

The delegation of public tasks to arm’s-length bodies remains a central feature of contemporary reform agendas within both developed and developing countries. The role and capacity of political and administrative principals (i.e. ministers and departments of state) to control the vast network of arm’s-length bodies for which they are formally responsible is therefore a critical issue within and beyond academe. In the run-up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom, the ‘quango conundrum’ emerged as an important theme and all three major parties committed themselves to shift the balance of power back towards ministers and sponsor departments. This article presents the results of the first major research project to track and examine the subsequent reform process. It reveals a stark shift in internal control relationships from the pre-election ‘poor parenting’ model to a far tighter internal situation that is now the focus of complaints by arm’s-length bodies of micro-management. This shift in the balance of power and how it was achieved offers new insights into the interplay between different forms of governance and has significant theoretical and comparative relevance. Points for practitioners: For professionals working in the field of arm’s-length governance, the article offers three key insights. First, that a well-resourced core executive is critical to directing reform given the challenges of implementing reform in a context of austerity. Second, that those implementing reform will also need to take into account the diverse consequences of centrally imposed reform likely to result in different departments with different approaches to arm’s-length governance. Third, that reforming arm’s-length governance can affect the quality of relationships, and those working in the field will need to mitigate these less tangible challenges to ensure success.