Analysis and design of power management scheme for an on-board solar energy storage system

This paper investigates the power management issues in a mobile solar energy storage system. A multi-converter based energy storage system is proposed, in which solar power is the primary source while the grid or the diesel generator is selected as the secondary source. The existence of the secondary source facilitates the battery state of charge detection by providing a constant battery charging current. Converter modeling, multi-converter control system design, digital implementation and experimental verification are introduced and discussed in details. The prototype experiment indicates that the converter system can provide a constant charging current during solar converter maximum power tracking operation, especially during large solar power output variation, which proves the feasibility of the proposed design. © 2014 IEEE.

Selection of power market structure using the analytic hierarchy process

Selection of a power market structure from the available alternatives is an important activity within an overall power sector reform programme. The evaluation criteria for selection are both subjective as well as objective in nature and the selection of alternatives is characterised by their conflicting nature. This study demonstrates a methodology for power market structure selection using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), a multiple attribute decision-making technique, to model the selection methodology with the active participation of relevant stakeholders in a workshop environment. The methodology is applied to a hypothetical case of a State Electricity Board reform in India.

Interactions within heterogeneous systems of uncontrolled rectifiers for aircraft electrical power systems

There is an increase in the use of multi-pulse, rectifier-fed motor-drive equipment on board more-electric aircraft. Motor drives with feedback control appear as constant power loads to the rectifiers, which can cause instability of the DC filter capacitor voltage at the output of the rectifier. This problem can be exacerbated by interactions between rectifiers that share a common source impedance. In order that such a system can be analysed, there is a need for average, dynamic models of systems of rectifiers. In this study, an efficient, compact method for deriving the approximate, linear, large-signal, average models of two heterogeneous systems of rectifiers, which are fed from a common source impedance, is presented. The models give insight into significant interaction effects that occur between the converters, and that arise through the shared source impedance. First, a 6-pulse and doubly wound, transformer-fed, 12-pulse rectifier system is considered, followed by a 6-pulse and autotransformer-fed, 12-pulse rectifier system. The system models are validated against detailed simulations and laboratory prototypes, and key characteristics of the two system types are compared.

Vertical and horizontal scope economies in the regulated US electricity power industry

This paper investigates vertical economies between generation and distribution of electric power, and horizontal economies between different types of power generation in the U.S. electric utility industry. Our quadratic cost function model includes three generation output measures (hydro, nuclear and fossil fuels), which allows us to analyze the effect that generation mix has on vertical economies. Our results provide (sample mean) estimates of vertical economies of 8.1% and horizontal economies of 5.4%. An extensive sensitivity analysis is used to show how the scope measures vary across alternative model specifications and firm types. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.