Linking performance-related pay to a Business School's mission and objectives

This paper first analyses the Performance Related Pay (PRP) schemes developed from 1992/3 to 2002/3 in a large Business School in England and then the School’s mission and strategic objectives in that period. The PRP schemes changed to include more specific performance indicators and these were increasingly linked to the objectives. The School’s resources allocated to PRP increased from £44,000 in 1992/93 to £355,000 in 2002/3 and from 1.08% in 1995/96 to 2.37% of the School’s income in 2002/3. As well as examining the changing strategic objectives and PRP schemes, the paper charts the development of the School’s reputation and resources and the role which staff motivation via PRP played at different stages. The paper concludes that the PRP scheme was at its most effective when it was clearly linked with the School’s strategic objectives, but that the relationship between objectives and motivation may be more complex than apparent from this study. Although the PRP scheme under consideration also applies to academic related staff, this paper concentrates on the effect on academic staff.

Executive pay, tournaments and corporate performance in UK firms

Recent initiatives for modernising local government have ignored the potential contribution of parish and town councils. This article critically examines English parish and town councils in the context of the current debate about the need for government to be more responsive to community needs. It considers measures to enhance the capacity of these grassroots councils by recalibrating the responsibilities and resources between tiers of local government. It concludes by setting out possible reforms to facilitate the contribution of these local councils to the modernising agenda as both representatives of the community and potential providers of local services.

Wage bargaining, privatisation, ability to pay and outside options:evidence from Hungary

This article examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for 1996–99. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between incumbent employees and managers, which the data do not reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relates to state sector workers versus privatised firms with majority foreign ownership.

Wage bargaining, privatisation, ability to pay, and outside options:evidence from Hungary

This paper examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for the period of 1996-1999. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between the incumbent employees and the managers, which we are unable to reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relate to state sector workers versus the privatised firms with the majority foreign ownership. We examine several extensions. We augment the bargaining specification by controls related to workers' skills and find that the basic findings are robust to that. We take a closer look at the outside options of the workers. We find some interactive effects, where unemployment modify the impact of availability of rents on wages. We interpret our results as an indication that bargaining power of workers may be affected by changes in their outside options. We also experiment with one concise indicator of reservation wage which is closest to the theoretical model specification and combines sectoral wages, unemployment benefits and regional unemployment levels,. We found that measure performing well. Finally, we found that while responsiveness of wages towards ability to pay is higher in the state sector, variation in wage dynamics is lower. This may indicate some wage smoothing in the state sector, consistent with the preferences of employees.

Do women earn less even as social entrepreneurs? The gender pay gap among UK social enterprise directors

Based upon unique survey data collected using respondent driven sampling methods, we investigate whether there is a gender pay gap among social entrepreneurs in the UK. We find that women as social entrepreneurs earn 29% less than their male colleagues, above the average UK gender pay gap of 19%. We estimate the adjusted pay gap to be about 23% after controlling for a range of demographic, human capital and job characteristics, as well as personal preferences and values. These differences are hard to explain by discrimination since these CEOs set their own pay. Income may not be the only aim in an entrepreneurial career, so we also look at job satisfaction to proxy for non-monetary returns. We find female social entrepreneurs to be more satisfied with their job as a CEO of a social enterprise than their male counterparts. This result holds even when we control for the salary generated through the social enterprise. Our results extend research in labour economics on the gender pay gap as well as entrepreneurship research on women’s entrepreneurship to the novel context of social enterprise. It provides the first evidence for a “contented female social entrepreneur” paradox.