Between Moscow and London. Romanian Orthodoxy and National Communism, 1960-1965

This article analyses the convoluted path of the Romanian communist regime's rapprochement with the West in the early 1960s. While, officially, the church supported the regime, the hierarchs strengthened their contacts with the West. This article argues that, paradoxically, church participation in international religious dialogue represented direct support for the nationalist stance of Romanian Communism. The increased number of ecumenical relations between Romania and the West reached its climax with the visit of Michael Ramsey, the Archbishop of Canterbury, to Romania in 1965, a few months before the country became the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Ireland and immigration: explaining the absence of the far right

Garner seeks to explain the absence of far-right political formations in the history of the Republic of Ireland, especially in relation to immigration. He argues that the ‘mainstream’ nationalist parties have implemented a racialized governance of Ireland via the issue of citizenship (in the referendum of 2004). While hegemonic ideas on the racial purity of indigenous populations and the highly ambivalent attitudes and policies on immigration pursued over the last decade are characteristic of a broader European trend, this has not, in the Republic, been accompanied by meaningful far-right political mobilization. Ireland has frequently been seen as sui generis in political terms, and indeed emerges in some ways as a counter-case: increasing hostility towards Others has been identified in the midst of rapid economic growth and political stability. A variety of issues related to the country’s political development have given rise to an especially small left-wing vote, a nationalist centre ground and longlasting domination by a single populist party, Fianna Fa´ il. This party has been partnered in government since 1997 by a free-market party, the Progressive Democrats, who have contributed to Ireland’s movement towards neo-liberal policies and a highly functional approach to immigration. The transition from country of emigration to country of immigration has thus taken place against an ideological backdrop in which the imperatives of labour demand and consolidating domestic support for reform have made an uneasy match, resulting in the racialization of Irishness. The state has, however, amended the Constitution in order to qualify jus soli citizenship entitlement in the case of particular categories of people: those whose parents are not Irish nationals. The significant stakes of these changes are analysed in the context of state responses to Eire’s transition to a country of immigration, and the role of nationalist-populism in the country’s political culture.

War crimes, conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans

The baleful legacy of the wars of the 1990s continues to dog the states and societies of the former Yugoslavia and has overshadowed the disappointingly slow and hesitant trajectory of the region towards the EU. At the start of the new millennium, with the removal of key wartime leaders from the political scene in both Croatia and Serbia, it was widely hoped that the region would prove able to ‘leave the past behind’ and rapidly move on to the hopeful new agenda of EU integration. The EU’s Copenhagen criteria, which in 1993 first explicitly set out the basic political conditions expected of aspirant EU Member States, proved effective in the case of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in supporting the entrenchment of democratic norms and practices, and stimulating reconciliation and good neighbourly relations among countries with turbulent histories. Building on this experience, the Stabilisation and Association Process, launched for the countries of the Western Balkans in 1999, included both full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and regional reconciliation among the political conditions set for advancing these countries on the path to EU integration. EU political conditionality was intended to support the efforts of new political leaders to redefine national goals away from the nationalist enmities of the past and focus firmly on forging a path to a better future. This Chaillot Paper examines the extent to which this strategy has worked, especially in the light of the difficulties it has encountered in the face of strong resistance to cooperation among sections of the former Yugoslav population, many of whom have not yet fully acknowledged the crimes committed during the 1990s. Key chapters in the volume raise the vital questions of leadership and political will. EU political conditionality does not work unless the EU has a partner ready and willing to ‘play the game’, which presupposes that EU integration has become the overriding priority on the national political agenda.

A critical evaluation of theories of nationalism

This thesis considers the main theoretical positions within the contemporary sociology of nationalism. These can be grouped into two basic types, primordialist theories which assert that nationalism is an inevitable aspect of all human societies, and modernist theories which assert that nationalism and the nation-state first developed within western Europe in recent centuries. With respect to primordialist approaches to nationalism, it is argued that the main common explanation offered is human biological propensity. Consideration is concentrated on the most recent and plausible of such theories, sociobiology. Sociobiological accounts root nationalism and racism in genetic programming which favours close kin, or rather to the redirection of this programming in complex societies, where the social group is not a kin group. It is argued that the stated assumptions of the sociobiologists do not entail the conclusions they draw as to the roots of nationalism, and that in order to arrive at such conclusions further and implausible assumptions have to be made. With respect to modernists, the first group of writers who are considered are those, represented by Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn and Elie Kedourie, whose main thesis is that the nation-state and nationalism are recent phenomena. Next, the two major attempts to relate nationalism and the nation-state to imperatives specific either to capitalist societies (in the `orthodox' marxist theory elaborated about the turn of the twentieth century) or to the processes of modernisation and industrialisation (the `Weberian' account of Ernest Gellner) are discussed. It is argued that modernist accounts can only be sustained by starting from a definition of nationalism and the nation-state which conflates such phenomena with others which are specific to the modern world. The marxist and Gellner accounts form the necessary starting point for any explanation as to why the nation-state is apparently the sole viable form of polity in the modern world, but their assumption that no pre-modern society was national leaves them without an adequate account of the earliest origins of the nation-state and of nationalism. Finally, a case study from the history of England argues both the achievement of a national state form and the elucidation of crucial components of a nationalist ideology were attained at a period not consistent with any of the versions of the modernist thesis.

'Compliance or contradiction'? Teaching 'History' in the 'New' Ukraine. A view from Ukraine's Eastern borderlands

Whilst much academic rigour has been devoted to analysing the ‘contents’ of historical textbooks in Ukraine, this article examines the teacher's role in the ‘transfer’ of the state's message to schoolchildren. This article demonstrates that in Ukraine's eastern borderlands teachers are highly active in negotiating the new historical narrative. Teachers are found to subtly change the accent or focus away from the ‘nationalist’ stance towards Russia, as found in the school history textbooks, to a more tolerant stance which aims to promote rather than negate Ukraine's historical interactions with Russia. Thus, this simultaneously reinforces a particular ‘regional’ understanding of historical events.

Nationalism gone global:the Hauptverband Deutscher Flottenvereine im Auslande 1898-1918

The Wilhelmine battle fleet was a powerful symbol of national strength and unity not only within the Reich but also in German ethnic communities abroad. A global network of 179 navy clubs with 9,500 members (1913) was coordinated by the Berlin-based Central League for German Navy Clubs Abroad (Hauptverband Deutscher Flottenvereine im Auslande). Its aims were the collection of migrants’ money for concrete navy projects and the promotion of allegiance to the Reich and of ethnic cohesion abroad. The article analyses German navy campaigning within a transnational framework and supports the view that migrants were discursively drawn into Imperial Germany’s global aspirations as outposts of ‘Germanness’ abroad. Existing scholarship, however, tends to look at them as passive objects of a discourse conducted within Germany, as a canvas onto which (semi-)colonial fantasies could be projected. This article argues, rather, that ‘Germans abroad’ could also be active participants within a transnationally conducted and multi-directional discourse. They did not necessarily defy nationalist assumptions but could, in fact, be deeply embedded in the construction of these assumptions.

Protestantism, nation and diaspora in Imperial Germany

This article examines the close connection between Protestantism and nationalism in Imperial Germany within a transnational context. In the years before 1914, the Prussian State Church in particular strengthened the legal and organisational framework for an increasing number of diaspora congregations to become attached. These acted as an important vehicle to embed the nationalist rhetoric produced within the Reich into emigrants' notions of belonging. Whilst previous scholarship has noted this connection in general, the article sheds more detailed light on the mechanics and structure, but also on the limits, of this process. Feedback processes from periphery to centre, in turn, had an impact on German national identity construction as that of a nation that was not confined to state borders. Applying a constructionist theoretical framework, the contested question of whether the heterogeneity of Germans abroad allows for the application of the diaspora concept is answered affirmatively.

Marine Le Pen and the 'New' FN:a change of style or of substance?

The electoral challenge of the far right is an enduringly problematic feature of contemporary French politics. In the first rounds of the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, the Front National (FN) under new leader Marine Le Pen attracted a combined total of ten million votes, bringing its ultra-nationalist policies to the centre of national political debate. This article examines the FN's impact on these elections and its implications for French politics. Drawing on official FN programmes, detailed election results and a range of opinion polling data, it assesses the strength of support for Le Pen and her party and seeks to explain their electoral appeal. In particular, it subjects to analysis the claim that the new leader has ‘de-demonised’ the FN, transforming it from perennial outsider to normal participant in mainstream French politics; and it reflects on the strategic dilemma posed for the centre-right by this newly invigorated far-right challenge.

Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe

Nation-building processes in the Orthodox commonwealth brought together political institutions and religious communities in their shared aims of achieving national sovereignty. Chronicling how the churches of Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia acquired independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the wake of the Ottoman Empire’s decline, Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe examines the role of Orthodox churches in the construction of national identities. Drawing on archival material available after the fall of communism in southeastern Europe and Russia, as well as material published in Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Russian, Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe analyzes the challenges posed by nationalism to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the ways in which Orthodox churches engaged in the nationalist ideology.

The Romanian Orthodox Church

At first glance, the nationalist ideology of the French Revolution seems to have had little impact on the Orthodox Church in Romanian-speaking territories. Romanians were the predominant inhabitants of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the neighboring territories of Transylvania (including Crişana, Maramureş and Banat), Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Dobrudja. The majority of ethnic Romanians belonged to the Orthodox faith while their communities were at the intersection of geopo liti cal interests of the Rus sian, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires. In 1859 the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (known as the Old Kingdom between 1866 and 1918) united into a single state under the rule of a local prince. The term "Romania" began to be used by the new state in its of cial documents in 1862. Two years later, the state supported the declaration of a Romanian autocephalous (in de pen dent) church that was recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1885. As an integrative part of the Orthodox commonwealth, the church was situated between the competing jurisdictions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Rus sian Orthodox Church, while its declaration of autocephaly followed a pattern in the spread of national churches in Southeastern Europe. From the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774 to the beginning of the Greek War for In de pen dence in 1821, the Romanian principalities were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, which had full control of their po liti cal and economic affairs. The sultan appointed princes, and the Porte determined their po liti cal and judicial status. The princes were drawn from the "Phanariots," and were directly appointed by the Porte from preponderantly Greek elite rather than the Romanian local elite, the boyars (boieri).1 In each principality, the church was headed by a metropolitan who was under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. That religion mattered to local population as a means of social cohesion was suggestively depicted by Anatole de Demidoff, an En glish traveler in the region in 1837. Arriving in Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, he claimed that: I know of no city in Europe in which it is possible to find more agreeable society, or in which there is a better tone, united with the most charming gaiety⋯. Religion, which is here of the schismatic Greek creed, does not, properly speaking, hold any great empire over the minds of the Wallachian people, but they observe its outward forms, and particularly the austerities of fasting, with scrupulous exactitude. The people are seen to attend divine ser vice with every sign of respect, and the great number of churches existing in Wallachia, bear witness to the ardent zeal with which outward worship is honored.2 The Romanian Orthodox Church was a national institution, closely linked to social, economic, and po liti cal structures. In most cases, Orthodox hierarchs were appointed from the families of boyars, thus ensuring a close relationship with the state authorities and its policies. As one of the largest landowners in the principalities, the church had a prime role in administrating healthcare and education. Although the majority of the clergy was uneducated, it dispensed both ecclesiastical and civil justice and in many cases worked closely with boyars in local administration.3 The lower clergy not only contributed directly to the economy but also benefited from tax privileges. Some small villages had an unusually high proportion of clergy in comparison to the overall population. For example, in 1810, Stənisləveşti, a village in the south of Wallachia, was composed of eleven houses and had two priests, five deacons, and three cantors; similarly, the Frəsinet village of nineteen houses had two priests and five deacons.4 Although these cases were exceptional, they indicate both the economic value of being a member of the clergy and the wider canonical dimension of church jurisdiction. The special status of the clergy was reflected not only at lower but also at higher levels. Bishops and metropolitans engaged with state policy and in many cases opposition to the authorities led to the loss of a spiritual seat. The metropolitan of each principality worked with the prince and was president of the divan, the gathering of all boyars. He held the right to be the first person to comment on state policy and to make recommendations when the prince was absent. The metropolitan replaced the prince when the principality had no political ruler, such as in the cases of Metropolitan Veniamin Costachi of Moldavia in 1806 and Metropolitan Dositei Filitti of Wallachia, while the bishops of Buzəu and Argeş were members of the provisional government during the Rus sian occupation of the principalities in 1808. The higher clergy had both religious and political prerogatives in relation to foreign powers as evident in their heading of the boyars' delegation to peace negotiation between the Rus sian and Ottoman empires at Focşani in 1772 and addressing memoranda to the Austrian and Rus sian governments in 1802.5 The primary role of the church in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia was paralleled by the national mobilization of Orthodox communities in the neighboring territories that had Romanian inhabitants. Although throughout the region Orthodox communities were incorporated into church structures as part of the Habsburg, Austrian or Rus sian empires, the nineteenth century was characterized by the leadership's search for political autonomy and the building of a Romanian national identity. The Orthodox communities outside the Old Kingdom maintained relations with the faithful in principalities across the Carpathian Mountains and the Dniester River and sought support in their struggle for political and religious rights.