Measuring accounting disclosure in a period of complex changes : the case of Egypt

Significant changes in accounting disclosure are observed in periods of economic change such as those relating to emerging capital markets and programs of privatization. Measurement of the level of accounting disclosure should ideally be designed to capture the complexity of change in order to give insight and explanation to match the causes and consequences of change. This paper shows the added interpretive value in subdividing the disclosure checklist to reflect the requirements of national accounting regulations, the location of disclosure items in the annual report, and limitations on the availability of regulations in official translation to the local language. Defining targeted disclosure categories leads to significance testing of specific aspects of changes in accounting disclosure in the Egyptian capital market in the 1990s. Strong correlation of disclosure with the presence of majority government ownership of the company and the relative activity of share trading supports the applicability of political costs and capital need theories, respectively. The relation between International Accounting Standards (IASs) disclosure and the type of audit firm points to additional theoretical explanations, including relative familiarity with the legislation and compliance features identifiable with the emerging capital market. The approach described in this paper has the potential for enhancing understanding of the complexity of accounting change in other emerging capital markets and developing economies.

CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

The disclosure of directors' share option information in UK companies

This paper considers the empirical determinants of the quality of information disclosed about directors’ share options in a sample of large companies in 1994 and 1995. Policy recommendations, consolidated in the recommendations of the Greenbury report, argue for full and complete disclosure of director option information. In this paper two modest contributions to the UK empirical literature are made. First, the current degree of option information disclosure in the FTSE 350 companies is documented. Second, option information disclosure as a function of variables that are thought to in¯uence corporate costs of disclosure is modelled. The results have implications for corporate governance. Speci®cally, support is oVered for the monitoring function of nonexecutive directors. In addition, nondisclosure is found to be related to variables which proxy proprietary costs of revealing information (such as company size).

Measuring accounting disclosure in a period of complex changes:the case of Egypt

Significant changes in accounting disclosure are observed in periods of economic change such as those relating to emerging capital markets and programs of privatization. Measurement of the level of accounting disclosure should ideally be designed to capture the complexity of change in order to give insight and explanation to match the causes and consequences of change. This paper shows the added interpretive value in subdividing the disclosure checklist to reflect the requirements of national accounting regulations, the location of disclosure items in the annual report, and limitations on the availability of regulations in official translation to the local language. Defining targeted disclosure categories leads to significance testing of specific aspects of changes in accounting disclosure in the Egyptian capital market in the 1990s. Strong correlation of disclosure with the presence of majority government ownership of the company and the relative activity of share trading supports the applicability of political costs and capital need theories, respectively. The relation between International Accounting Standards (IASs) disclosure and the type of audit firm points to additional theoretical explanations, including relative familiarity with the legislation and compliance features identifiable with the emerging capital market. The approach described in this paper has the potential for enhancing understanding of the complexity of accounting change in other emerging capital markets and developing economies.

Corporate governance disclosure in the Gulf countries

Corporate governance disclosure is important for countries aiming to attract international investors and reduce companies’ cost of capital. The relationship between corporate governance disclosure (CGD) and its determinants is the main objective of the current research. Accordingly, the research aimed to: (i) assess CGD level in the Gulf countries; (ii) investigate the impact of ownership structure (proportion of institutional, governmental, managerial and family ownership) on CGD; (iii) explore the effect of board characteristics (proportion of independent board members, proportion of family members on board, CEO/chairman duality and board size) on CGD; (iv) examine the relationship between diversity (proportion of foreign and female members on a board and in the senior management team) and CGD; and (v) test the association between firm characteristics (company size, age, liquidity, profitability, leverage, industry and auditor types) and CGD. Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were selected for the study since they share similar characteristics and represent a relatively homogeneous category in the Middle East and North African region. A CGD index of 232 items was developed and divided into six categories: ownership structure and investor rights; financial transparency and information disclosure; information on auditors; board and senior management structure and process; board committees; and finally corporate behaviour and responsibility. Annual reports available for listed non-financial companies of the Gulf countries were 270 for the year 2009. The maximum CGD level was 63%, whereas the minimum was 5%, with an average disclosure level of 32%. Several regression models were conducted to enhance the robustness of the results and conclusions of the study. The results indicated that five variables had a significant positive relationship with CGD: proportion of independent members on a board, proportion of foreign members on a board, proportion of foreign members in the senior management team, auditor type and profitability. The research contributes to the literature on corporate governance voluntary disclosure in developing countries. Practical contributions consist of several recommendations to policy makers, regulators, and professional institutions in the Gulf countries.