Working under a black cloud:how to sustain organizational identification after a merger

This article argues against the merger folklore that maintains that a merger negatively affects well-being and work attitudes primarily through the threat of job insecurity. We hold that the workplace is not only a resource for fulfilling a person's financial needs, but that it is an important component of the self-concept in terms of identification with the organization, as explained by social identity theory. We unravel the key concepts of the social identity approach relevant to the analysis of mergers and review evidence from previous studies. Then, we present a study conducted during a merger to substantiate our ideas about the effects of post-merger organizational identification above and beyond the effects of perceived job insecurity. We recommend that managers should account for these psychological effects through the provision of continuity and specific types of communication. © 2006 British Academy of Management.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.

Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases

This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects. This subset of cases offers an opportunity to shed empirical light on the conditions where a Competition Authority believes tacit collusion is most likely to arise. We find that, for the Commission, tacit collusion is a rare phenomenon, largely confined to markets of two, more or less symmetric, players. This is consistent with recent experimental literature, but contrasts with the facts on ‘hard-core’ collusion in which firm numbers and asymmetries are often much larger.

Unilateral versus coordinated effects:comparing the impact on consumer welfare of alternative merger outcomes

The nature of tacitly collusive behaviour often makes coordination unstable, and this may result in periods of breakdown, during which consumers benet from reduced prices. This is allowed for by adding demand uncertainty to the Compte et al. (2002) model of tacit collusion amongst asymmetric rms. Breakdowns occur when a rm cannot exclude the possibility of a deviation by a rival. It is then possible that an outcome with collusive behaviour, subject to long/frequent break downs, can improve consumer welfare compared to an alternative with sustained unilateral conduct. This is illustrated by re-examining the Nestle/Perrier merger analyzed by Compte et al., but now also taking into account the potential for welfare losses arising from unilateral behaviour.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision.

Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases

The purpose of this paper is to identify empirically the implicit structural model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and concentration, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects (i.e. collective dominance). Apart from its obvious policy-relevance, the paper is designed to shed empirical light on the conditions under which tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the market shares of the two firms.

Unilateral versus coordinated effects:comparing the impact on consumer welfare of alternative merger outcomes

The nature of tacitly collusive behaviour often makes coordination unstable, and this may result in periods of breakdown, during which consumers benefit from reduced prices. This is allowed for by adding demand uncertainty to the Compte et al. (2002) model of tacit collusion amongst asymmetric firms. Breakdowns occur when a firm cannot exclude the possibility of a deviation by a rival. It is then possible that an outcome with collusive behaviour, subject to long/frequent break downs, can improve consumer welfare compared to an alternative with sustained unilateral conduct. This is illustrated by re-examining the Nestle/Perrier merger analyzed by Compte et al., but now also taking into account the potential for welfare losses arising from unilateral behaviour.

International retail restructuring and divestment: the experience of Tesco

A key purpose of this study is to explore the lessons learned from international retail divestment and market withdrawal experiences. Drawing on 33 in-depth interviews with leading investment banks and key retail executives at Tesco, the study investigates the company's international restructuring and divestment activities in Ireland and France during the mid -1980s and 1990s. It has been demonstrated that, despite the progressive merger and acquisition wave sweeping through the corporate retail landscape recently, international retail divestment is quite widespread. The main conclusion from this study is that Tesco originally did not envisage divestment or de-internationalisation as part of the original internationalisation strategy process in either the acquisition of Three Guys in Ireland or Catteau in France. There was no appreciation from Tesco during their early period of expansion of the fact that exit pressures might arise during the course of market entry. In this regard, the case study provides insights into the relationship between investment and divestment within the context of international retail restructuring. The case evidence also demonstrates the positive impact of the Three Guys and Catteau divestments which helped management to refocus and rejuvenate the company's internationalisation process.

The strategic role of investment banks in the retailer internationalisation process: is this venture marketing?

In recent years the scale and scope of retailer internationalisation activity has grown markedly, mainly through increasing levels of cross-border merger and acquisition activity. This has been particularly prevalent among companies operating in the food retail sector. During this time, and within the context of increased merger and acquisition activity in international markets, the financial institutions have taken an increasingly prominent role in the retail internationalisation process. Explores the nature of the financial institutions’ role in the retailer internationalisation process and, specifically, the extent to which the financial institutions actually inhibit and/or promote retail international activity. A key purpose of this study is to examine some of the drivers and inhibitors of the retailer internationalisation process. Reports the findings from 30 in-depth interviews with food retail analysts of the leading investment banks in the City of London. The findings from this study should help to provide further insights into the nature of the retailer internationalisation process.

Cause, effect and benefits of a standardised corporate visual identity system of UK companies operating in Malaysia

Investigates the degree of global standardisation of a corporate visual identity system (CVIS) in multinational operations. A special emphasis of this research is accorded to UK companies operating in Malaysia. In particular, the study seeks to reveal the reasons for developing a standardised CVIS; the behavioural issues associated with CVIS; and the determination in selecting a graphic design agency. The findings of the research revealed that multinational corporations in an increasingly corporate environment adopted a standardised CVIS for several reasons, including, aiding the sale of products and services, creating an attractive environment for hiring employees, and increasing the company’s stature and presence. Further findings show that the interest in global identity was stimulated by global restructuring, merger or acquisition. The above trends help explain why increased focus has been accorded to CVIS over the past five years by many UK companies operating in Malaysia. Additional findings reveal that both the UK design agencies and in-house design department are used in the development of the firms’ CVIS.

Affect networks:a structural analysis of the relationship between work ties and job-related affect

The relationship between organizational networks and employees' affect was examined in 2 organizations. In Study 1, social network analysis of work ties and job-related affect for 259 employees showed that affect converged within work interaction groups. Similarity of affect between employees depended on the presence of work ties and structural equivalence. Affect was also related to the size and density of employees' work networks. Study 2 used a 10-week diary study of 31 employees to examine a merger of 2 organizational divisions and found that negative changes in employees' affect were related to having fewer cross-divisional ties and to experiencing greater reductions in network density. The findings suggest that affect permeates through and is shaped by organizational networks.

Learning for life:educational provision at Cadbury, 1831-1981

Cadbury showed concern for the welfare of its labour force in a variety of ways and not least in the provision of educational and educative-recreational facilities. The firm regarded the education of employees as having a positive effect on the efficiency of the business at the same time as being of benefit to the individual, the local community and the nation. The life-long education of people was seen as essential for personal fulfilament, social improvement, economic competitiveness and the proper functioning of democratic procedures. The educational system built up at Cadbury, and the philosophy on which it was founded, acquired both a domestic and international reputation. Its main components were the day continuation education of juniors; the Bournville Works Evening Institute; vocational and non-vocational scholarships; emphasis on the primary importance of general education as a basis for life, work and technical training; stress on equality of educational opportunity for females; and leisure and sporting amenities which the firm felt to be educative in the sense that they contributed to personal psychological and physical development and social skills. The system was primarily shaped and constructed in the first three decades of the twentieth century and went into decline and eventual demise in the 1960's and 1970's as a result of economic pressures, social changes, enhanced state arrangements for education, shifts in Cadbury management thinking and the merger with Schweppes in 1969.

Tacit vs. overt collusion firm asymmetries and numbers:what's the evidence?

It is conventional wisdom that collusion is more likely the fewer firms there are in a market and the more symmetric they are. This is often theoretically justified in terms of a repeated non-cooperative game. Although that model fits more easily with tacit than overt collusion, the impression sometimes given is that ‘one model fits all’. Moreover, the empirical literature offers few stylized facts on the most simple of questions—how few are few and how symmetric is symmetric? This paper attempts to fill this gap while also exploring the interface of tacit and overt collusion, albeit in an indirect way. First, it identifies the empirical model of tacit collusion that the European Commission appears to have employed in coordinated effects merger cases—apparently only fairly symmetric duopolies fit the bill. Second, it shows that, intriguingly, the same story emerges from the quite different experimental literature on tacit collusion. This offers a stark contrast with the findings for a sample of prosecuted cartels; on average, these involve six members (often more) and size asymmetries among members are often considerable. The indirect nature of this ‘evidence’ cautions against definitive conclusions; nevertheless, the contrast offers little comfort for those who believe that the same model does, more or less, fit all.