The authority of complexity

The assertion about the unique 'complexity' or the peculiarly intricate character of social phenomena has, at least within sociology, a long, venerable and virtually uncontested tradition. At the turn of the last century, classical social theorists, for example, Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim, made prominent and repeated reference to this attribute of the subject matter of sociology and the degree to which it complicates, even inhibits the development and application of social scientific knowledge. Our paper explores the origins, the basis and the consequences of this assertion and asks in particular whether the classic complexity assertion still deserves to be invoked in analyses that ask about the production and the utilization of social scientific knowledge in modern society. We present John Maynard Keynes' economic theory and its practical applications as an illustration. We conclude that the practical value of social scientific knowledge is not dependent on a faithful, in the sense of complete, representation of social reality. Instead, social scientific knowledge that wants to optimize its practicality has to attend and attach itself to elements of social situations that can be altered or are actionable.

The unique complexity of social phenomena and the uses of social science knowledge

The assertion about the peculiarly intricate and complex character of social phenomena has, in much of social discourse, a virtually uncontested tradition. A significant part of the premise about the complexity of social phenomena is the conviction that it complicates, perhaps even inhibits the development and application of social scientific knowledge. Our paper explores the origins, the basis and the consequences of this assertion and asks in particular whether the classic complexity assertion still deserves to be invoked in analyses that ask about the production and the utilization of social scientific knowledge in modern society. We refer to one of the most prominent and politically influential social scientific theories, John Maynard Keynes' economic theory as an illustration. We conclude that, the practical value of social scientific knowledge is not necessarily dependent on a faithful, in the sense of complete, representation of (complex) social reality. Practical knowledge is context sensitive if not project bound. Social scientific knowledge that wants to optimize its practicality has to attend and attach itself to elements of practical social situations that can be altered or are actionable by relevant actors. This chapter represents an effort to re-examine the relation between social reality, social scientific knowledge and its practical application. There is a widely accepted view about the potential social utility of social scientific knowledge that invokes the peculiar complexity of social reality as an impediment to good theoretical comprehension and hence to its applicability.

Die Macht der Erkenntnis

John Maynard Keynes als »Retter des Kapitalismus« hat die westlichen Demokratien grundlegend verändert und die Grundlagen für eine neue und erneut aktuelle Wirtschaftspolitik geschaffen. Im Fall der »Rassenhygiene« haben Wissenschaftler als Vordenker der Vernichtung kulturelle und politische Ressourcen genutzt, um ihre Wissensansprüche durchzusetzen – mit fatalen Folgen. Der Klimawandel schließlich ist ein von Wissenschaftlern, Politikern und Experten intensiv diskutiertes Thema, gleichwohl haben die diesbezüglichen Erkenntnisse einen überraschend geringen Einfluß auf die praktische Politik. Anhand dieser drei Beispiele untersucht das Buch das prekäre Verhältnis von Wissen und politischer Macht.