Highly emotional States:French-US Relations and the Iraq war

Understanding the true nature of the relations between France and the United States is central to an understanding of the diplomatic crisis that broke out between them in 2003 over the War in Iraq. An analysis of the political cultures of France and the US offers considerable explanatory power to this dramatic diplomatic dispute. The inordinately emotional aspects of the Franco-US arguments of 2003 mask the fact that the two countries understand each other little. In the French case, its self-view and related diplomatic comportment in the twentieth century was informed by its relationship to Germany; and from it a range of cultural characteristics emerged, among them: vulnerability, self-regard, a romanticized view of itself, and the personalization of national identity. At the moment France’s response to its cultural heritage was beginning to shift to a different (post-Gaullist) paradigm, the dispute with the US erupted.

Institutions and equity structure of foreign affiliates

Question/Issue: We combine agency and institutional theory to explain the division of equity shares between the foreign (majority) and local (minority) partners within foreign affiliates. We posit that once the decision to invest is made, the ownership structure is arranged so as to generate appropriate incentives to local partners, taking into account both the institutional environment and the firm-specific difficulty in monitoring. Research Findings/Insights: Using a large firm-level dataset for the period 2003-2011 from 16 Central and Eastern European countries and applying selectivity corrected estimates, we find that both weaker host country institutions and higher share of intangible assets in total assets in the firm imply higher minority equity share of local partners. The findings hold when controlling for host country effects and when the attributes of the institutional environment are instrumented. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The classic view is that weak institutions lead to concentrated ownership, yet it leaves the level of minority equity shares unexplained. Our contribution uses a firm-level perspective combined with national-level variation in the institutional environment, and applies agency theory to explain the minority local partner share in foreign affiliates. In particular, we posit that the information asymmetry and monitoring problem in firms are exacerbated by weak host country institutions, but also by the higher share of intangible assets in total assets. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Assessing investment opportunities abroad, foreign firms need to pay attention not only to features directly related to corporate governance (e.g., bankruptcy codes) but also to the broad institutional environment. In weak institutional environments, foreign parent firms need to create strong incentives for local partners by offering them significant minority shares in equity. The same recommendation applies to firms with higher shares of intangible assets in total assets. © 2014 The Authors.