Capital markets and the market structure of foreign investments

Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct ownership. Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital component of the multinational’s competitive market structure. Moreover, multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets. They can also mitigate higher levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial risk to creditors in the host economy. Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their equity to foreign market risk. Multinationals can modify the profit maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 countries.We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries. We also find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by modifying their capital structure and debt maturity. Further, we show how the operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or profit maximization. We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good asset utilization.

The causal relationship between information and communication technology and foreign direct investment

This paper investigates the simultaneous causal relationship between investments in information and communication technology (ICT) and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), with reference to its implications on economic growth. For the empirical analysis we use data from 23 major countries with heterogeneous economic development for the period 1976-99. Our causality test results suggest that there is a causal relationship from ICT to FDI in developed countries, which means that a higher level of ICT investment leads to an increase inflow of FDI. ICT may contribute to economic growth indirectly by attracting more FDI. Contrarily, we could not find significant causality from ICT to FDI in developing countries. Instead, we have partial evidence of opposite causality relationship: the inflow of FDI causes further increases in ICT investment and production capacity. © United Nations University 2006.

The role of commitment in foreign-Japanese relationships:mediating performance for foreign sellers in Japan

A lack of commitment between Japanese buyers and their foreign trading partners is often attributed as the cause of failure for foreign sellers in Japan. Due to Japanese idiosyncrasies, commitment plays a dominant, but poorly understood, role in the business relationship between foreign sellers and Japanese buyers. This research examines the role that the attachment bond between U.S. sellers and Japanese buyers plays in mediating the impact of exchange characteristics on performance in the domestic Japanese market. An analysis of 198 U.S. sellers in Japan demonstrates the complex web of calculative, social, and normative factors that account for the commitment existing in this foreign–Japanese trading relationship. The results highlight the importance of specific investments and cultural sensitivity for the seller’s commitment and the role of trust and switching costs in the buyer’s commitment.

Does German foreign direct investment lead to job losses at home?

This paper provides firm-level evidence on the labour demand effects of outward investments using a panel of multinationals (MNEs) based in Germany. Distinguishing the type of investments and the location of subsidiaries around the world between 1997 and 2008, our evidence shows that for both the manufacturing and services sector the expansion of employment abroad does not occur at the detriment of employment at home. The analysis is extended to see whether outward FDI causes average wage cuts for workers employed in the German parent firm. Our findings indicate no clear average wage effects due to outward FDI. Given that domestic MNEs are seen to play an important role in the growth potential for an economy, these findings are somewhat re-assuring from a policy point of view.

Foreign direct investment and corruption

In the last few decades, the world has witnessed an enormous growth in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). The global stock of FDI reached US$ 7.5 trillion in 2003 and accounted for 11% of world Gross Domestic Product, up from 7% in 1990. The sales of multinational enterprises at around US$ 19 trillion were more than double the level of world exports. Substantial FDI inflows went into transition countries. Inflows into one of the region's largest recipient, the Russian Federation, almost doubled, enabling Russia to become one of the five top FDI destinations in 2005-2006. FDI inflows in Russia have increased almost threefold from 13.6% in 2003 to 35% in 2007. In 2003, these flows were twice greater than those into China; whilst in 2007 they were six times larger. Russia's FDI inflows were also about 2.5 times greater than those of Brazil. Efficient government institutions are argued by many economists to foster FDI and growth as a result. However, the magnitude of this effect has yet to be measured. This thesis takes a Political Economy approach to explore, empirically, the potential impact of malfunctioning governmental institutions, proxied by three indices of perceived corruption, on FDI stocks accumulation/distribution within Russia over the period of 2002-2004. Using a regional data-set it concentrates on three areas relating to FDI. Firstly, it considers the significance, the size and the sign of the impact of perceived corruption on accumulation of FDI stocks within Russia. Secondly, it quantifies the impact of perceived corruption on the volume of FDI stocks simultaneously estimating the impact of the investment in public capital such as telecommunications and transportation networks on FDI in the presence of corruption. In particular, it addresses the question whether more corrupt regions in Russia are also those that could have accumulated more of FDI stocks, and investigates whether those 'more corrupt' regions would have had lower level of public capital investment. Finally, it examines whether decentralisation increases or decreases corruption and whether a larger extent of decentralisation has a positive or negative impact on FDI (stocks). The results of three studies are as follows. Firstly, along with market potential, corruption is found to be one of the key factors in explaining FDI distribution within Russia between 2002 and 2004. Secondly, corruption on average is found to be related to FDI positively suggesting that it may act as speed money: to save their time foreign direct investors might be willing to bribe the regional authorities so to move in front of the bureaucratic lines. Thirdly, although when corruption is controlled for, the impact of the latter on unobservable FDI is found to be on average positive, no association between FDI and public investment is observed with the only exception of transportation infrastructure (i.e., railway). The results might suggest therefore that it is possible that not only regions with high levels of perceived corruption attract more FDI but also that expansions in public capital investments are not accompanied by an increase of the volume of FDI (stocks) in regions with high levels of corruption. This casts some doubt on the productivity of the investment in public capital in these regions as it might be that bureaucrats may prefer to use these infrastructural projects for rent extraction. Finally, we find decentralisation to have a significant and positive impact on both FDI stock accumulation and corruption, suggesting that local governments may spend more on public goods to make the area more attractive to foreign investors but at the same time they may be interested into extracting rents from foreign investors. These results support the idea that the regulation of FDI is associated with and facilitated by a larger public sector, which distorts competition and introduces opportunities for rent-seeking by particular economic and political factors.