Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.

Institutional entrepreneurship:a literature review and analysis of the maturing consulting field

With few exceptions (e.g. Fincham & Clark, 2002; Lounsbury, 2002, 2007; Montgomery & Oliver, 2007), we know little about how emerging professions, such as management consulting, professionalize and establish their services as a taken-for-granted element of social life. This is surprising given that professionals have long been recognized as “institutional agents” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008) (see Chapter 17) and professionalization projects have been closely associated with institutionalization (DiMaggio, 1991). Therefore, in this chapter we take a closer look at a specific type of entrepreneurship in PSFs; drawing on the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio, 1988; Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Hardy & Maguire, 2008) we describe some generic strategies by which proto-professions can enhance their “institutional capital” (Oliver, 1997), that is, their capacity to extract institutionally contingent resources such as legitimacy, reputation, or client relationships from their environment.

Institutional shifts in inter-municipal service delivery:an analysis of developments in eight Western European countries

Comparative research on inter-municipal cooperation in eight European countries shows that there is a great variety of institutional arrangements for cooperation across the different countries. Also, these arrangements tend to change over time in terms of the scope of cooperation among partners, their composition and the degree of organizational integration. This article describes and analyzes the variety of and shifts in institutional arrangements for a specific class of inter-municipal cooperation arrangements: those that are set up to provide for the joint delivery of public services. It is argued that specific arrangements are typically the outcomes of interaction between national institutional contexts,?environmental factors and local preferences.

Management consulting firms as institutional agents:strategies for creating and sustaining institutional capital

We classify the strategies by which management consultancies can create and sustain the institutional capital that makes it possible for them to extract competitive resources from their institutional context. Using examples from the German consulting industry, we show how localized competitive actions can enhance both individual firms’ positions, and also strengthen the collective institutional capital of the consulting industry thus legitimizing consulting services in broader sectors of society and facilitating access to requisite resources. Our findings counter the image of institutional entrepreneurship as individualistic, “heroic” action. We demonstrate how distributed, embedded actors can collectively shape the institutional context from within to enhance their institutional capital.

'Family' ownership, tunnelling and earnings management:a review of the literature

In this review paper, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross-country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.

Institutional change and the challenge of policy coordination in the English regions

By contrast to major constitutional reforms elsewhere in the UK, in England's eight regions beyond London New Labour has favoured administrative decentralisation. This paper examines these institutional arrangements and assesses their capacity to develop a more integrated approach to territorial development. It confirms a growing awareness of the need to ensure greater coherence between policies to promote economic, social and environmental wellbeing. Nonetheless, a complex regional institutional architecture, inconsistent sector-based strategies, a lack of strategic leadership and blurred accountabilities hamper moves towards policy integration and the delivery of joint outcomes. Moreover, despite ongoing reforms, the absence of a clear regional agenda in a functionally designed Whitehall raises fundamental questions about the ability of sub-national bodies to work collectively to develop and implement a more coherent approach to regional policy.

Rotating the boards:corporate governance

Can companies resolve groupthink issues and improve their performance by turning over their boards more often, ask Mark Rogers and Amir Satvat.