The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

The curious absence of inter-municipal co-operation in England

In Europe local authorities often work with their neighbouring municipalities, whether to address a specific task or goal or through the course of regular policy making and implementation. In England, however, inter-municipal co-operation (IMC) is less common. Councils may work with service providers from the private and non-profit sectors but less often with neighbouring local authorities. Why this is the case may be explained by a number of historical and policy factors that often encourage councils to compete, rather than to work collaboratively with each other. The present government has encouraged councils to work in partnership with other organizations but there are few examples of increased horizontal cooperation between local authorities. Instead the prevailing model remains fixed on vertical co-working predicated on a principal-agent relationship between higher and lower tiers of government.

Mathematical modelling and control of agitated extraction columns

Liquid-liquid extraction has long been known as a unit operation that plays an important role in industry. This process is well known for its complexity and sensitivity to operation conditions. This thesis presents an attempt to explore the dynamics and control of this process using a systematic approach and state of the art control system design techniques. The process was studied first experimentally under carefully selected. operation conditions, which resembles the ranges employed practically under stable and efficient conditions. Data were collected at steady state conditions using adequate sampling techniques for the dispersed and continuous phases as well as during the transients of the column with the aid of a computer-based online data logging system and online concentration analysis. A stagewise single stage backflow model was improved to mimic the dynamic operation of the column. The developed model accounts for the variation in hydrodynamics, mass transfer, and physical properties throughout the length of the column. End effects were treated by addition of stages at the column entrances. Two parameters were incorporated in the model namely; mass transfer weight factor to correct for the assumption of no mass transfer in the. settling zones at each stage and the backmixing coefficients to handle the axial dispersion phenomena encountered in the course of column operation. The parameters were estimated by minimizing the differences between the experimental and the model predicted concentration profiles at steady state conditions using non-linear optimisation technique. The estimated values were then correlated as functions of operating parameters and were incorporated in·the model equations. The model equations comprise a stiff differential~algebraic system. This system was solved using the GEAR ODE solver. The calculated concentration profiles were compared to those experimentally measured. A very good agreement of the two profiles was achieved within a percent relative error of ±2.S%. The developed rigorous dynamic model of the extraction column was used to derive linear time-invariant reduced-order models that relate the input variables (agitator speed, solvent feed flowrate and concentration, feed concentration and flowrate) to the output variables (raffinate concentration and extract concentration) using the asymptotic method of system identification. The reduced-order models were shown to be accurate in capturing the dynamic behaviour of the process with a maximum modelling prediction error of I %. The simplicity and accuracy of the derived reduced-order models allow for control system design and analysis of such complicated processes. The extraction column is a typical multivariable process with agitator speed and solvent feed flowrate considered as manipulative variables; raffinate concentration and extract concentration as controlled variables and the feeds concentration and feed flowrate as disturbance variables. The control system design of the extraction process was tackled as multi-loop decentralised SISO (Single Input Single Output) as well as centralised MIMO (Multi-Input Multi-Output) system using both conventional and model-based control techniques such as IMC (Internal Model Control) and MPC (Model Predictive Control). Control performance of each control scheme was. studied in terms of stability, speed of response, sensitivity to modelling errors (robustness), setpoint tracking capabilities and load rejection. For decentralised control, multiple loops were assigned to pair.each manipulated variable with each controlled variable according to the interaction analysis and other pairing criteria such as relative gain array (RGA), singular value analysis (SVD). Loops namely Rotor speed-Raffinate concentration and Solvent flowrate Extract concentration showed weak interaction. Multivariable MPC has shown more effective performance compared to other conventional techniques since it accounts for loops interaction, time delays, and input-output variables constraints.