Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision.

Corporate taxation, corporate power, and corporate harm

Globalisation has increased corporate tax competition amongst states and facilitated widespread corporate tax avoidance. Some of the largest businesses now pay little or no tax: in some cases with the active assistance of governments. This article examines contemporary corporation tax policies, outlines some of the key methods corporations use to minimise their tax liabilities, explores the interdependencies between the demand for reduced tax liabilities and the professional infrastructure of tax planning and avoidance, and examines how the contemporary political economy of corporate taxation enhances the bargaining power of transnational corporations in the implementation of tax policy.

WASAN : the development of a facilitated methodology for structuring a waste minimisation problem

This paper contributes a new methodology called Waste And Source-matter ANalyses (WASAN) which supports a group in building agreeable actions for safely minimising avoidable waste. WASAN integrates influences from the Operational Research (OR) methodologies/philosophies of Problem Structuring Methods, Systems Thinking, simulation modelling and sensitivity analysis as well as industry approaches of Waste Management Hierarchy, Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Studies and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The paper shows how these influences are compiled into facilitative structures that support managers in developing recommendations on how to reduce avoidable waste production. WASAN is being designed as Health and Safety Executive Guidance on what constitutes good decision making practice for the companies that manage nuclear sites. In this paper we report and reflect on its use in two soft OR/problem structuring workshops conducted on radioactive waste in the nuclear industry. Crown Copyright © 2010.