Nonlinearity in all-night sleep EEG recorded with foramen ovale electrodes in a patient with temporal lobe epilepsy

Objective: It is investigated to which extent measures of nonlinearity derived from surrogate data analysis are capable to quantify the changes of epileptic activity related to varying vigilance levels. Methods: Surface and intracranial EEG from foramen ovale (FO-)electrodes was recorded from a patient with temporal lobe epilepsy under presurgical evaluation over one night. Different measures of nonlinearity were estimated for non-overlapping 30-s segments for selected channels from surface and intracranial EEG. Additionally spectral measures were calculated. Sleep stages were scored according to Rechtschaffen/Kales and epileptic transients were counted and classified by visual inspection. Results: In the intracranial recordings stronger nonlinearity was found ipsilateral to the epileptogenic focus, more pronounced in NREM sleep, weaker in REM sleep. The dynamics within the NREM episodes varied with the different nonlinearity measures. Some nonlinearity measures showed variations with the sleep cycle also in the intracranial recordings contralateral to the epileptic focus and in the surface EEG. It is shown that the nonlinearity is correlated with short-term fluctuations of the delta power. The higher frequency of occurrence of clinical relevant epileptic spikes in the first NREM episode was not clearly reflected in the nonlinearity measures. Conclusions: It was confirmed that epileptic activity renders the EEG nonlinear. However, it was shown that the sleep dynamics itself also effects the nonlinearity measures. Therefore, at the present stage it is not possible to establish a unique connection between the studied nonlinearity measures and specific types of epileptic activity in sleep EEG recordings.

Seeing and believing: three episodes in the history of neurophysiology

In this contribution I look at three episodes in the history of neurophysiology that bring out the complex relationship between seeing and believing. I start with Vesalius in the mid-sixteenth century who writes that he can in no way see any cavity in nerves, even in the optic nerves. He thus questions the age-old theory (dating back to the Alexandrians in the third century BC) but, because of the overarching psychophysiology of his time, does not press his case. This conflict between observation and theory persisted for a quarter of a millennium until finally resolved at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the discoveries of Galvani and Volta. The second case is provided by the early history of retinal synaptology. Schultze in 1866 had represented rod spherules and bipolar dendrites in the outer plexiform layer as being separated by a (synaptic) gap, yet in his written account, because of his theoretical commitments, held them to be continuous. Cajal later, 1892, criticized Schultze for this pusillanimity, but his own figure in La Cellule is by no means clear. It was only with the advent of the electron microscopy in the mid-twentieth century that the true complexity of the junction was revealed and it was shown that both investigators were partially right. My final example comes from the Hodgkin-Huxley biophysics of the 1950s. Their theory of the action potential depended on the existence of unseen ion pores with quite complex biophysical characteristics. These were not seen until the Nobel-Prize-winning X-ray diffraction analyses of the early twenty-first century. Seeing, even at several removes, then confirmed Hodgkin and Huxley’s belief. The relation between seeing and believing is by no means straightforward.

Cardiocentric neurophysiology:the persistence of a delusion

Aristotle is well known to have taught that the brain was a mere coolant apparatus for overheated blood and to have located the hegemonikon in the heart. This teaching was hotly disputed by his immediate successors in the Alexandrian Museum, who showed that the brain played the central role in psychophysiology. This was accepted and developed by the last great biomedical figure of classical antiquity - Claudius Galen. However, Aristotle's cardiocentric theory did not entirely disappear and this article traces its influence through the Arabic physicians of the Islamic ascendancy, into the European Middle Ages where Albertus Magnus' attempt to reconcile cardiocentric and cerebrocentric physiology was particularly influential. It shows how cardiocentricity was sufficiently accepted to attract the attention of, and require refutation by, many of the great names of the Renaissance, including Vesalius, Fernel, and Descartes, and was still taken seriously by luminaries such as William Harvey in the mid-seventeenth century. The article, in rehearsing this history, shows the difficulty of separating the first-person perspective of introspective psychology and the third-person perspective of natural science. It also outlines an interesting case of conflict between philosophy and physiology. © 2013 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Brain, mind and consciousness in the history of neuroscience

From Platonic and Galenic roots, the first well developed ventricular theory of brain function is due to Bishop Nemesius, fourth century C.E. Although more interested in the Christian concept of soul, St. Augustine, too addressed the question of the location of the soul, a problem that has endured in various guises to the present day. Other notable contributions to ventricular psychology are the ninth century C.E. Arabic writer, Qusta ibn Lūqā, and an early European medical text written by the twelfth century C.E. author, Nicolai the Physician. By the time of Albertus Magnus, so-called medieval cell doctrine was a well-developed model of brain function. By the sixteenth century, Vesalius no longer understands the ventricles to be imaginary cavities designed to provide a physical basis for faculty psychology but as fluid-filled spaces in the brain whose function is yet to be determined