Loan loss provisions, earnings management and capital management under IFRS:the case of EU commercial banks

Prior research has shown that loan loss provisions are primarily used as a tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks. Effective 2005 all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adherence to IFRS, it is claimed, should enhance transparency of reporting practices relative to local General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to manage earnings and capital. We use a sample of 91 EU listed commercial banks covering a period of 10 years (before and after implementation of IFRS). Since early adopters may have different incentives and motivations relative to those who adopt mandatorily, we dichotomize our sample into early and late adopters. Overall, we find that earnings management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. We also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes. Overall, we conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions.

Loan loss provisions, bank valuations and discretion : a comparative study between conventional and Islamic banks

This study investigates the use of reported loan loss provisions (LLP) by investors in their valuations of banks within the Middle East and North Africa region between the years 2006 and 2011. We decompose LLP into discretionary and non-discretionary components to test for differential valuations in the two banking sectors. We use alternative criteria to define the components of LLP in banks: loan quality/size and earnings management/ manipulation incentives. We employ a price-level valuation model estimated using two-stage analyses. We find that LLP has positive value relevance to investors in both banking sectors. Investors in Islamic banks price the discretionary component relatively lower than their conventional counterparts. We attribute this result to differences in product and governance structures as well as to the religious perception of Islamic banking. In both banking sectors, investors construe an increase in the non-discretionary component as irrelevant valuation information. Our results are relevant to bank regulators in showing the signalling effect of LLP to bank value and stability.

Loan loss provisions, bank valuations and discretion:a comparative study between conventional and Islamic banks

This study investigates the use of reported loan loss provisions (LLP) by investors in their valuations of banks within the Middle East and North Africa region between the years 2006 and 2011. We decompose LLP into discretionary and non-discretionary components to test for differential valuations in the two banking sectors. We use alternative criteria to define the components of LLP in banks: loan quality/size and earnings management/manipulation incentives. We employ a price-level valuation model estimated using two-stage analyses. We find that LLP has positive value relevance to investors in both banking sectors. Investors in Islamic banks price the discretionary component relatively lower than their conventional counterparts. We attribute this result to differences in product and governance structures as well as to the religious perception of Islamic banking. In both banking sectors, investors construe an increase in the non-discretionary component as irrelevant valuation information. Our results are relevant to bank regulators in showing the signalling effect of LLP to bank value and stability. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.