False recognition of objects in visual scenes:findings from a combined direct and indirect memory test

We report an extension of the procedure devised by Weinstein and Shanks (Memory & Cognition 36:1415-1428, 2008) to study false recognition and priming of pictures. Participants viewed scenes with multiple embedded objects (seen items), then studied the names of these objects and the names of other objects (read items). Finally, participants completed a combined direct (recognition) and indirect (identification) memory test that included seen items, read items, and new items. In the direct test, participants recognized pictures of seen and read items more often than new pictures. In the indirect test, participants' speed at identifying those same pictures was improved for pictures that they had actually studied, and also for falsely recognized pictures whose names they had read. These data provide new evidence that a false-memory induction procedure can elicit memory-like representations that are difficult to distinguish from "true" memories of studied pictures. © 2012 Psychonomic Society, Inc.

Public attitudes on the ethics of deceptively planting false memories to motivate healthy behavior

Researchers have proposed that planting false memories could have positive behavioral consequences. The idea of deceptively planting “beneficial” false memories outside of the laboratory raises important ethical questions, but how might the general public appraise this moral dilemma? In two studies, participants from the USA and UK read about a fictional “false-memory therapy” that led people to adopt healthy behaviors. Participants then reported their attitudes toward the acceptability of this therapy, via scale-rating (both studies) and open-text (Study 2) responses. The data revealed highly divergent responses to this contentious issue, ranging from abject horror to unqualified enthusiasm. Moreover, the responses shed light on conditions that participants believed would make the therapy less or more ethical. Whether or not deceptively planting memories outside the lab could ever be justifiable, these studies add valuable evidence to scientific and societal debates on neuroethics, whose relevance to memory science is increasingly acute.

Disowned recollections:denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering

Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them-that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

On the persuadability of memory:is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.

Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts

Many people who drink alcohol have experienced a blackout; whereby they are unable to recall events that occurred during a period of intoxication. Following these blackout episodes individuals may attempt to reconstruct what happened to them. Blackouts therefore afford an excellent opportunity to study the strategies people use to reconstruct forgotten experiences. We conducted a survey of university students to explore how people choose to reconstruct blackouts, and the likely accuracy of these reconstructions. Our findings add to the growing research literature on people's strategies for validating their past experiences, and highlight the important role of external sources in the reconstruction process. The data show that people's desire to "fill in the blanks" can lead them to rely on rather unreliable sources, and may also encourage them to adopt weaker source-monitoring criteria. Indeed, in at least some cases reconstructing blackouts appears to lead to the development of false beliefs or memories. © 2011 Psychology Press.

Why do doctored images distort memory?

Doctored images can cause people to believe in and remember experiences that never occurred, yet the underlying mechanism(s) responsible are not well understood. How does compelling false evidence distort autobiographical memory? Subjects were filmed observing and copying a Research Assistant performing simple actions, then they returned 2 days later for a memory test. Before taking the test, subjects viewed video-clips of simple actions, including actions that they neither observed nor performed earlier. We varied the format of the video-clips between-subjects to tap into the source-monitoring mechanisms responsible for the 'doctored-evidence effect.' The distribution of belief and memory distortions across conditions suggests that at least two mechanisms are involved: doctored images create an illusion of familiarity, and also enhance the perceived credibility of false suggestions. These findings offer insight into how external evidence influences source-monitoring. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Digitally manipulating memory:effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings. © 2009 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.

When is an image a health claim? A false-recollection method to detect implicit inferences about products' health benefits

Objective: Images on food and dietary supplement packaging might lead people to infer (appropriately or inappropriately) certain health benefits of those products. Research on this issue largely involves direct questions, which could (a) elicit inferences that would not be made unprompted, and (b) fail to capture inferences made implicitly. Using a novel memory-based method, in the present research, we explored whether packaging imagery elicits health inferences without prompting, and the extent to which these inferences are made implicitly. Method: In 3 experiments, participants saw fictional product packages accompanied by written claims. Some packages contained an image that implied a health-related function (e.g., a brain), and some contained no image. Participants studied these packages and claims, and subsequently their memory for seen and unseen claims were tested. Results: When a health image was featured on a package, participants often subsequently recognized health claims that—despite being implied by the image—were not truly presented. In Experiment 2, these recognition errors persisted despite an explicit warning against treating the images as informative. In Experiment 3, these findings were replicated in a large consumer sample from 5 European countries, and with a cued-recall test. Conclusion: These findings confirm that images can act as health claims, by leading people to infer health benefits without prompting. These inferences appear often to be implicit, and could therefore be highly pervasive. The data underscore the importance of regulating imagery on product packaging; memory-based methods represent innovative ways to measure how leading (or misleading) specific images can be. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Misrepresentations and flawed logic about the prevalence of false memories

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an “upper bound” on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.