The Presidents in the French Fifth Republic

This volume brings together French and British scholars of France to analyse one of French politics' most intellectually compelling phenomena, the presidency of the republic. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of that leadership as well as the way that executive power has been established in the Fifth Republic; how presidential power and the subsequent full scale development of 'personality politics' developed within an essentially party-driven, democratic and, most importantly, republican system. Hence the authors in this volume examine the phenomenon of a strong presidency in the French republican framework. The individual chapters focus on the presidency and upon the individual presidents and the way in which they have addressed their own relation to the presidencies they presided over on top of a range of other factors informing their terms of office. A conclusion sums up and appraises the contemporary role of the French presidency within the party system and the republic. The project has generated a great deal of interest in the French political studies community.

Departmental elections and the changing landscape of French politics

The departmental elections of March 2015 redrew the French political landscape, setting the new terms of electoral competition in advance of the regional elections of December 2015 and, more critically, the presidential election of April–May 2017. These elections saw the far-right National Front (FN) come top in both rounds only to be outmanoeuvred by the mainstream parties and prevented from winning a single department. As a case study in vote–seat distortion, the elections highlighted a voting system effective in keeping the FN out of executive power but deficient in terms of democratic representation and inadequate as a response to the new tripartite realities of France's changing political landscape.

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation:an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.