Recall, verbatim memory and remembered narratives

Memory is central to investigative interviews with witnesses and suspects, yet decades of research have shown that remembering is subject to constructive and reconstructive processes that can adversely impact the reliability of accounts that are elicited at interview. In this chapter we first outline research concerning our memory for events (‘episodic memory’) before moving on to discuss the ways in which our attempts to validate and communicate those memories can bias what is eventually reported. We then focus on some of the implications this can have for investigative interviews, specifically the problem of ‘skill fade’ in interviewing, the impact of implicit beliefs about memory and issues surrounding the reliability of recollections of direct speech. We conclude that appropriately structuring the retrieval context is the key to achieving best memory evidence.

Event related potential (ERP) evidence for selective impairment of verbal recollection in abstinent recreational methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“Ecstasy”)/polydrug users

Objectives Ecstasy is a recreational drug whose active ingredient, 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), acts predominantly on the serotonergic system. Although MDMA is known to be neurotoxic in animals, the long-term effects of recreational Ecstasy use in humans remain controversial but one commonly reported consequence is mild cognitive impairment particularly affecting verbal episodic memory. Although event-related potentials (ERPs) have made significant contributions to our understanding of human memory processes, until now they have not been applied to study the long-term effects of Ecstasy. The aim of this study was to examine the effects of past Ecstasy use on recognition memory for both verbal and non-verbal stimuli using ERPs. Methods We compared the ERPs of 15 Ecstasy/polydrug users with those of 14 cannabis users and 13 non-illicit drug users as controls. Results Despite equivalent memory performance, Ecstasy/polydrug users showed an attenuated late positivity over left parietal scalp sites, a component associated with the specific memory process of recollection. Conlusions This effect was only found in the word recognition task which is consistent with evidence that left hemisphere cognitive functions are disproportionately affected by Ecstasy, probably because the serotonergic system is laterally asymmetrical. Experimentally, decreasing central serotonergic activity through acute tryptophan depletion also selectively impairs recollection, and this too suggests the importance of the serotonergic system. Overall, our results suggest that Ecstasy users, who also use a wide range of other drugs, show a durable abnormality in a specific ERP component thought to be associated with recollection.

The impact of the CACNA1C gene polymorphism on frontolimbic function in bipolar disorder

Genome-wide association studies in bipolar disorder (BD)1 have implicated a single-nucleotide polymorphism (rs1006737, G right arrow A) in the CACNA1C gene, which encodes for the alpha 1c (CAV1.2) subunit of the voltage-gated, L-type calcium channel. Neuroimaging studies of healthy individuals report that this risk allele modulates brain function within limbic (amygdala, anterior cingulate gyrus) and hippocampal regions during tasks of reward processing2, 3 and episodic memory. Moreover, animal studies suggest that the CaV1.2 L-type calcium channels influence emotional behaviour through enhanced neurotransmission via the lateral amygdala pathway. On the basis of this evidence, we tested the hypotheses that the CACNA1C rs1006737 risk allele will modulate neural responses within predefined prefrontal and subcortical regions of interest during emotional face processing and that this effect would be amplified in BD patients.

Conversational interaction in the scanner:mentalizing during language processing as revealed by MEG

Humans are especially good at taking another's perspective-representing what others might be thinking or experiencing. This "mentalizing" capacity is apparent in everyday human interactions and conversations. We investigated its neural basis using magnetoencephalography. We focused on whether mentalizing was engaged spontaneously and routinely to understand an utterance's meaning or largely on-demand, to restore "common ground" when expectations were violated. Participants conversed with 1 of 2 confederate speakers and established tacit agreements about objects' names. In a subsequent "test" phase, some of these agreements were violated by either the same or a different speaker. Our analysis of the neural processing of test phase utterances revealed recruitment of neural circuits associated with language (temporal cortex), episodic memory (e.g., medial temporal lobe), and mentalizing (temporo-parietal junction and ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Theta oscillations (3-7 Hz) were modulated most prominently, and we observed phase coupling between functionally distinct neural circuits. The episodic memory and language circuits were recruited in anticipation of upcoming referring expressions, suggesting that context-sensitive predictions were spontaneously generated. In contrast, the mentalizing areas were recruited on-demand, as a means for detecting and resolving perceived pragmatic anomalies, with little evidence they were activated to make partner-specific predictions about upcoming linguistic utterances.

How checking breeds doubt:reduced performance in a simple working memory task

A paradox of memory research is that repeated checking results in a decrease in memory certainty, memory vividness and confidence [van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003a). Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 369–378; van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003b). Repeated checking causes memory distrust. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 301–316]. Although these findings have been mainly attributed to changes in episodic long-term memory, it has been suggested [Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 313–323] that representations in working memory could already suffer from detrimental checking. In two experiments we set out to test this hypothesis by employing a delayed-match-to-sample working memory task. Letters had to be remembered in their correct locations, a task that was designed to engage the episodic short-term buffer of working memory [Baddeley, A. D. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component in working memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417–423]. Of most importance, we introduced an intermediate distractor question that was prone to induce frustrating and unnecessary checking on trials where no correct answer was possible. Reaction times and confidence ratings on the actual memory test of these trials confirmed the success of this manipulation. Most importantly, high checkers [cf. VOCI; Thordarson, D. S., Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., Shafran, R, Sawchuk, C. N., & Hakstian, A. R. (2004). The Vancouver obsessional compulsive inventory (VOCI). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289–1314] were less accurate than low checkers when frustrating checking was induced, especially if the experimental context actually emphasized the irrelevance of the misleading question. The clinical relevance of this result was substantiated by means of an extreme groups comparison across the two studies. The findings are discussed in the context of detrimental checking and lack of distractor inhibition as a way of weakening fragile bindings within the episodic short-term buffer of Baddeley's (2000) model. Clinical implications, limitations and future research are considered.

On the persuadability of memory:is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be 'persuaded' to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude-change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events - compatible with a source monitoring approach - would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.