Effective knowledge transfer: a terminological perspective - Dismantling the jargon barrier to knowledge about computer security

The research is concerned with the terminological problems that computer users experience when they try to formulate their knowledge needs and attempt to access information contained in computer manuals or online help systems while building up their knowledge. This is the recognised but unresolved problem of communication between the specialist and the layman. The initial hypothesis was that computer users, through their knowledge of language, have some prior knowledge of the subdomain of computing they are trying to come to terms with, and that language can be a facilitating mechanism, or an obstacle, in the development of that knowledge. Related to this is the supposition that users have a conceptual apparatus based on both theoretical knowledge and experience of the world, and of several domains of special reference related to the environment in which they operate. The theoretical argument was developed by exploring the relationship between knowledge and language, and considering the efficacy of terms as agents of special subject knowledge representation. Having charted in a systematic way the territory of knowledge sources and types, we were able to establish that there are many aspects of knowledge which cannot be represented by terms. This submission is important, as it leads to the realisation that significant elements of knowledge are being disregarded in retrieval systems because they are normally expressed by language elements which do not enjoy the status of terms. Furthermore, we introduced the notion of `linguistic ease of retrieval' as a challenge to more conventional thinking which focuses on retrieval results.

Integrating security services into computer supported cooperative work

This research describes the development of a groupware system which adds security services to a Computer Supported Cooperative Work system operating over the Internet. The security services use cryptographic techniques to provide a secure access control service and an information protection service. These security services are implemented as a protection layer for the groupware system. These layers are called External Security Layer (ESL) and Internal Security Layer (ISL) respectively. The security services are sufficiently flexible to allow the groupware system to operate in both synchronous and asynchronous modes. The groupware system developed - known as Secure Software Inspection Groupware (SecureSIG) - provides security for a distributed group performing software inspection. SecureSIG extends previous work on developing flexible software inspection groupware (FlexSIG) Sahibuddin, 1999). The SecureSIG model extends the FlexSIG model, and the prototype system was added to the FlexSIG prototype. The prototype was built by integrating existing software, communication and cryptography tools and technology. Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) and Internet technology were used to build the prototype. To test the suitability and transparency of the system, an evaluation was conducted. A questionnaire was used to assess user acceptability.

Product cipher negotiation with on-line evaluation for private communication over computer networks

A method is proposed to offer privacy in computer communications, using symmetric product block ciphers. The security protocol involved a cipher negotiation stage, in which two communicating parties select privately a cipher from a public cipher space. The cipher negotiation process includes an on-line cipher evaluation stage, in which the cryptographic strength of the proposed cipher is estimated. The cryptographic strength of the ciphers is measured by confusion and diffusion. A method is proposed to describe quantitatively these two properties. For the calculation of confusion and diffusion a number of parameters are defined, such as the confusion and diffusion matrices and the marginal diffusion. These parameters involve computationally intensive calculations that are performed off-line, before any communication takes place. Once they are calculated, they are used to obtain estimation equations, which are used for on-line, fast evaluation of the confusion and diffusion of the negotiated cipher. A technique proposed in this thesis describes how to calculate the parameters and how to use the results for fast estimation of confusion and diffusion for any cipher instance within the defined cipher space.

Reinforcing the security of corporate information resources:a critical review of the role of the acceptable use policy

Increasingly users are seen as the weak link in the chain, when it comes to the security of corporate information. Should the users of computer systems act in any inappropriate or insecure manner, then they may put their employers in danger of financial losses, information degradation or litigation, and themselves in danger of dismissal or prosecution. This is a particularly important concern for knowledge-intensive organisations, such as universities, as the effective conduct of their core teaching and research activities is becoming ever more reliant on the availability, integrity and accuracy of computer-based information resources. One increasingly important mechanism for reducing the occurrence of inappropriate behaviours, and in so doing, protecting corporate information, is through the formulation and application of a formal ‘acceptable use policy (AUP). Whilst the AUP has attracted some academic interest, it has tended to be prescriptive and overly focussed on the role of the Internet, and there is relatively little empirical material that explicitly addresses the purpose, positioning or content of real acceptable use policies. The broad aim of the study, reported in this paper, is to fill this gap in the literature by critically examining the structure and composition of a sample of authentic policies – taken from the higher education sector – rather than simply making general prescriptions about what they ought to contain. There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this study: (1) the primary role of the AUP appears to be as a mechanism for dealing with unacceptable behaviour, rather than proactively promoting desirable and effective security behaviours, and (2) the wide variation found in the coverage and positioning of the reviewed policies is unlikely to be fostering a coherent approach to security management, across the higher education sector.

The information security policy unpacked:a critical study of the content of university policies

Ensuring the security of corporate information, that is increasingly stored, processed and disseminated using information and communications technologies [ICTs], has become an extremely complex and challenging activity. This is a particularly important concern for knowledge-intensive organisations, such as universities, as the effective conduct of their core teaching and research activities is becoming ever more reliant on the availability, integrity and accuracy of computer-based information resources. One increasingly important mechanism for reducing the occurrence of security breaches, and in so doing, protecting corporate information, is through the formulation and application of a formal information security policy (InSPy). Whilst a great deal has now been written about the importance and role of the information security policy, and approaches to its formulation and dissemination, there is relatively little empirical material that explicitly addresses the structure or content of security policies. The broad aim of the study, reported in this paper, is to fill this gap in the literature by critically examining the structure and content of authentic information security policies, rather than simply making general prescriptions about what they ought to contain. Having established the structure and key features of the reviewed policies, the paper critically explores the underlying conceptualisation of information security embedded in the policies. There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this study: (1) the wide diversity of disparate policies and standards in use is unlikely to foster a coherent approach to security management; and (2) the range of specific issues explicitly covered in university policies is surprisingly low, and reflects a highly techno-centric view of information security management.