CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

Motives for corporate cash holdings:the CEO optimism effect

We examine the chief executive officer (CEO) optimism effect on managerial motives for cash holdings and find that optimistic and non-optimistic managers have significantly dissimilar purposes for holding more cash. This is consistent with both theory and evidence that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds. Optimistic managers hoard cash for growth opportunities, use relatively more cash for capital expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in adverse conditions. By contrast, they hold fewer inventories and receivables and their precautionary demand for cash holdings is less than that of non-optimistic managers. In addition, we consider debt conservatism in our model and find no evidence that optimistic managers’ cash hoarding is related to their preference to use debt conservatively. We also document that optimistic managers hold more cash in bad times than non-optimistic managers do. Our work highlights the crucial role that CEO characteristics play in shaping corporate cash holding policy.

CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

Supplier competitive advantage in inter-firm business relationships:is Keiretsu really a source of competitive advantage for Japanese automotive suppliers?

This paper explores how firms create and sustain competitive advantage in the inter-firm business relationships from a supplier’s perspective. Ultimately, this paper draws its attention to keiretsu partnerships and how it is perceived by Japanese automotive suppliers. Four main theoretical perspectives (resource based view, industrial organisation, transaction cost economics, and relational network) were considered when developing a conceptual framework based on competitive capability, market diversification, and level of engagement. The framework was examined against two best-practice automotive component suppliers. Later, primary data was also gathered through an interview with a CEO and a survey questionnaire with 11 Japanese companies. As a result, this paper classified these 11 companies into four supplier groups based on tier level (1 and 2) and affiliation condition. Findings propose that there may be little benefit in being an affiliated tier 1 supplier, and that independent tier 2 suppliers may be more competitive than affiliated ones.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: evidence from the UK

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.

An exploration of the determinants of innovation:the top management team, organisational climate and organisational learning

Some researchers argue that the top team, rather than the CEO, is a better predictor of an organisation’s fate (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Knight et al., 1999). However, others suggest that the importance of the top management team (TMT) composition literature is exaggerated (West & Schwenk, 1996). This has stimulated a need for further research on TMTs. While the importance of TMT is well documented in the innovation literature, the organisational environment also plays a key role in determining organisational outcomes. Therefore, the inclusion of both TMT characteristics and organisational variables (climate and organisational learning) in this study provides a more holistic picture of innovation. The research methodologies employed includes (i) interviews with TMT members in 35 Irish software companies (ii) a survey completed by managerial respondents and core workers in these companies (iii) in-depth interviews with TMT members from five companies. Data were gathered in two phases, time 1 (1998-2000) and time 2 (2003). The TMT played an important part in fostering innovation. However, it was a group process, rather than team demography, that was most strongly associated with innovation. Task reflexivity was an important predictor of innovation time 1, time 2). Only one measure of TMT diversity was associated with innovation - tenure diversity -in time 2 only. Organisational context played an important role in determining innovation. This was positively associated with innovation - but with one dimension of organisational learning only. The ability to share information (access to information) was not associated with innovation but the motivation to share information was (perceiving the sharing of information to be valuable). Innovative climate was also associated with innovation. This study suggests that this will lead to innovative outcomes if employees perceive the organisation to support risk, experimentation and other innovative behaviours.

Statistical guidelines for the analysis of data obtained from one or both eyes

Purpose - Measurements obtained from the right and left eye of a subject are often correlated whereas many statistical tests assume observations in a sample are independent. Hence, data collected from both eyes cannot be combined without taking this correlation into account. Current practice is reviewed with reference to articles published in three optometry journals, viz., Ophthalmic and Physiological Optics (OPO), Optometry and Vision Science (OVS), Clinical and Experimental Optometry (CEO) during the period 2009–2012. Recent findings - Of the 230 articles reviewed, 148/230 (64%) obtained data from one eye and 82/230 (36%) from both eyes. Of the 148 one-eye articles, the right eye, left eye, a randomly selected eye, the better eye, the worse or diseased eye, or the dominant eye were all used as selection criteria. Of the 82 two-eye articles, the analysis utilized data from: (1) one eye only rejecting data from the adjacent eye, (2) both eyes separately, (3) both eyes taking into account the correlation between eyes, or (4) both eyes using one eye as a treated or diseased eye, the other acting as a control. In a proportion of studies, data were combined from both eyes without correction. Summary - It is suggested that: (1) investigators should consider whether it is advantageous to collect data from both eyes, (2) if one eye is studied and both are eligible, then it should be chosen at random, and (3) two-eye data can be analysed incorporating eyes as a ‘within subjects’ factor.

A cross-national investigation into the marketing department's influence within the firm:toward initial empirical generalizations

An ongoing strong debate within the marketing discipline concerns the role of marketing within the firm. It has been frequently reported that the marketing function is in a deep decline. Marketing executives and academics alike are interested in the antecedents of this decline and potential performance consequences of this decline. Recent academic research have started investigations on this important topic. Using studies in single countries innovativeness and accountability of the marketing department has been reported as major antecedents of the influence of the marketing department within the organization. Academic research, however, does not provide convincing evidence for a direct link between this influence and business performance. Instead it shows that market orientation is a crucial intervening variable, as marketing department influence is positively related market orientation, which subsequently positively related to business performance. As noted prior research, however, studies firms in single countries. In this article we execute a cross-national study on the antecedents and performance consequences of marketing department influence in order to derive initial empirical generalizations. This study is executed in seven Western-oriented countries, including USA, UK, The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Israel and Australia. The study heavily builds on the framework developed in the 2009 Journal of Marketing article of Verhoef and Leeflang. This framework is tested per country and subsequently meta-analytic tests are used to derive initial empirical generalizations. An important empirical generalization is that innovativeness, the customer-connecting capabilities, and accountability of the marketing department are positively related to marketing department influence. Interestingly, a second initial generalization is that creativity of the marketing negative induces less influence. Our results also show a third empirical generalization in that firms having a CEO with a marketing background tend to have more influential marketing departments. Confirming prior research a fourth initial empirical generalization is that MD influence measures and market orientation are positively related. Market orientation is subsequently positively related to business performance. Our most important generalization is, however, that MD influence is positively related to business performance. Hence, beyond striving to become market oriented, firms should also aim to have strong marketing departments. These departments can create a stronger focus on the customer and can also coordinate marketing efforts. In order to become more influential marketing departments should: (1) acquire innovative capabilities, (2) be more connected to customers, (3) invest in accountability, and (4) be careful with be careful being too creative.

An examination of the comprehensiveness of corporate Internet reporting provided by London-listed companies

Recent changes in the regulatory environment of the London Stock Exchange are aimed at prohibiting selective disclosure and enhancing the credibility of reporting. Using an innovative 143-item disclosure checklist, we examine corporate Internet reporting (CIR) comprehensiveness and its determinants within this new regulatory environment. We also extend the literature linking corporate governance measures to CIR. Our findings indicate that despite this new regulatory environment, there is considerable room for improvement in CIR by London-listed companies. For example, our sample companies provide only 58 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of the credibility and usability items assessed by our comprehensiveness index. After controlling for size, profitability, industry, and high growth/ intangibles, we find the CIR comprehensiveness of London-listed companies is associated with analyst following, director holding, director independence, and CEO duality. Because prior research indicates the U.K. leads Europe in Internet reporting, our results may shed light on how CIR will evolve throughout Europe.

The impact of board independence and ownership structure on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of Irish-listed companies

Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.

NITL : what the transport and logistics industry needs going forward

The transport industry - particularly in road transport - is under serious competitive pressure. Rising costs - evident but not limited to fuel and insurance - combined with a market place that has become more demanding in relation to price and service, has resulted in a situation where companies have had to seriously reassess the nature of their competitive advantage. The competitive strategies of companies in the sector are being reviewed in light of the effective commoditisation of transport as a direct result of the traditional strong emphasis on cost and price reductions.

Interactive data in financial reporting:the construction of the non-professional investor

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States and in particular its immediately past chairman, Christopher Cox, has been actively promoting an upgrade of the EDGAR system of disseminating filings. The new generation of information provision has been dubbed by Chairman Cox, "Interactive Data" (SEC, 2006). In October this year the Office of Interactive Disclosure was created(http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-213.htm). The focus of this paper is to examine the way in which the non-professional investor has been constructed by various actors. We examine the manner in which Interactive Data has been sold as the panacea for financial market 'irregularities' by the SEC and others. The academic literature shows almost no evidence of researching non-professional investors in any real sense (Young, 2006). Both this literature and the behaviour of representatives of institutions such as the SEC and FSA appears to find it convenient to construct this class of investor in a particular form and to speak for them. We theorise the activities of the SEC and its chairman in particular over a period of about three years, both following and prior to the 'credit crunch'. Our approach is to examine a selection of the policy documents released by the SEC and other interested parties and the statements made by some of the policy makers and regulators central to the programme to advance the socio-technical project that is constituted by Interactive Data. We adopt insights from ANT and more particularly the sociology of translation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law, 1996, 2002; Law & Singleton, 2005) to show how individuals and regulators have acted as spokespersons for this malleable class of investor. We theorise the processes of accountability to investors and others and in so doing reveal the regulatory bodies taking the regulated for granted. The possible implications of technological developments in digital reporting have been identified also by the CEO's of the six biggest audit firms in a discussion document on the role of accounting information and audit in the future of global capital markets (DiPiazza et al., 2006). The potential for digital reporting enabled through XBRL to "revolutionize the entire company reporting model" (p.16) is discussed and they conclude that the new model "should be driven by the wants of investors and other users of company information,..." (p.17; emphasis in the original). Here rather than examine the somewhat illusive and vexing question of whether adding interactive functionality to 'traditional' reports can achieve the benefits claimed for nonprofessional investors we wish to consider the rhetorical and discursive moves in which the SEC and others have engaged to present such developments as providing clearer reporting and accountability standards and serving the interests of this constructed and largely unknown group - the non-professional investor.