The social cognitive neuroscience of organisations

Social cognitive neuroscience is an emerging branch of cognitive neuroscience that bridges together social psychology and neuroscience. At its core is an understanding of the relationship between the brain and social interaction. The social cognitive neuroscientist places empirical endeavor within a three–stage framework, and questions falling under the SCN rubric undergo interrogation at each of these three levels. Firstly, we seek to understand a neuroscience of social interactions at the social level. Here we need to understand the motivational and other social factors that drive our behavior and experience in the real world. It goes without saying that any study of the cognitive neuroscience of socially interactive behavior must first be informed by social psychological theory to maintain ecological validity. Second, the social cognitive neuroscientist must be an adroit cognitive psychologist and be able to examine interactive behavior from the cognitive level. It is here that information–processing models and theories are applied to the understanding of our social behavior. Finally, studies at the neural level seek to inform us about the cortical structures, as well as the way they interact with other, in the mediation of the previous cognitive level. This volume brings together contributions from leading thinkers in both the social cognitive neurosciences and business to provide a comprehensive introduction and overview of a social cognitive neuroscience of the business brain. NOTE: Annals volumes are available for sale as individual books or as a journal. For information on institutional journal subscriptions, please visit www.blackwellpublishing.com/nyas. ACADEMY MEMBERS: Please contact the New York Academy of Sciences directly to place your order (www.nyas.org). Members of the New York Academy of Science receive full–text access to the Annals online and discounts on print volumes. Please visit http://www.nyas.org/MemberCenter/Join.aspx for more information about becoming a member

Effective leadership in salient groups:revisiting leader-member exchange theory from the perspective of the social identity theory of leadership

Two studies compared leader-member exchange (LMX) theory and the social identity theory of leadership. Study 1 surveyed 439 employees of organizations in Wales, measuring work group salience, leader-member relations, and perceived leadership effectiveness. Study 2 surveyed 128 members of organizations in India, measuring identification not salience and also individualism/collectivism. Both studies provided good support for social identity predictions. Depersonalized leader-member relations were associated with greater leadership effectiveness among high-than low-salient groups (Study 1) and among high than low identifiers (Study 2). Personalized leadership effectiveness was less affected by salience (Study 1) and unaffected by identification (Study 2). Low-salience groups preferred personalized leadership more than did high-salience groups (Study 1). Low identifiers showed no preference but high identifiers preferred depersonalized leadership (Study 2). In Study 2, collectivists did not prefer depersonalized as opposed to personalized leadership, whereas individualists did, probably because collectivists focus more on the relational self.

Psychology in the real world: Community-based groupwork Guy Holmes. (2010). PCCS Books: Herefordshire; 311 pp. ISBN 978 1 906254 13 1

Book Review

A facial expression for anxiety

Anxiety and fear are often confounded in discussions of human emotions. However, studies of rodent defensive reactions under naturalistic conditions suggest anxiety is functionally distinct from fear. Unambiguous threats, such as predators, elicit flight from rodents (if an escape-route is available), whereas ambiguous threats (e.g., the odor of a predator) elicit risk assessment behavior, which is associated with anxiety as it is preferentially modulated by anti-anxiety drugs. However, without human evidence, it would be premature to assume that rodent-based psychological models are valid for humans. We tested the human validity of the risk assessment explanation for anxiety by presenting 8 volunteers with emotive scenarios and asking them to pose facial expressions. Photographs and videos of these expressions were shown to 40 participants who matched them to the scenarios and labeled each expression. Scenarios describing ambiguous threats were preferentially matched to the facial expression posed in response to the same scenario type. This expression consisted of two plausible environmental-scanning behaviors (eye darts and head swivels) and was labeled as anxiety, not fear. The facial expression elicited by unambiguous threat scenarios was labeled as fear. The emotion labels generated were then presented to another 18 participants who matched them back to photographs of the facial expressions. This back-matching of labels to faces also linked anxiety to the environmental-scanning face rather than fear face. Results therefore suggest that anxiety produces a distinct facial expression and that it has adaptive value in situations that are ambiguously threatening, supporting a functional, risk-assessing explanation for human anxiety.

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message.

The phenomenology of minority-majority status:effects on innovation in argument generation

In three experiments, we manipulated participants' perceived numerical status and compared the originality and creativity of arguments generated by members of numerical minorities and majorities. Independent judges, blind to experimental conditions, rated participants' written arguments. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants assigned to a numerical minority generated more original arguments when advocating their own position than did numerical majorities. In Study 3, an equal-factions control group was included in the design, and all participants were instructed to argue for a counter-attitudinal position. Those in the numerical minority generated more creative arguments than those in both the majority and equal-factions conditions, but not stronger arguments. We propose cognitive and social processes that may underlie our obtained effects and discuss implications for minority influence research.

Uncertainty and the influence of group norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship

Two studies were conducted to examine the impact of subjective uncertainty on conformity to group norms in the attitude-behaviour context. In both studies, subjective uncertainty was manipulated using a deliberative mindset manipulation (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). In Study 1 (N = 106), participants were exposed to either an attitude-congruent or an attitude-incongruent in-group norm. In Study 2(N = 83), participants were exposed to either a congruent, incongruent, or an ambiguous in-group norm. Ranges of attitude-behaviour outcomes, including attitude-intention consistency and change in attitude-certainty, were assessed. In both studies, levels of group-normative behaviour varied as a function of uncertainty condition. In Study 1, conformity to group norms, as evidenced by variations in the level of attitude-intention consistency, was observed only in the high uncertainty condition. In Study 2, exposure to an ambiguous norm had different effects for those in the low and die high uncertainty conditions. In the low uncertainty condition, greatest conformity was observed in the attitude-congruent norm condition compared with an attitude-congruent or ambiguous norm. In contrast, individuals in the high uncertainty condition displayed greatest conformity when exposed to either an attitude-congruent or an ambiguous in-group norm. The implications of these results for the role of subjective uncertainty in social influence processes are discussed. © 2007 The British Psychological Society.

Group consensus in social influence:type of consensus information as a moderator of majority and minority influence

Three experiments investigated the effect of consensus information on majority and minority influence. Experiment 1 examined the effect of consensus expressed by descriptive adjectives (large vs. small) on social influence. A large source resulted in more influence than a small source, irrespective of source status (majority vs. minority). Experiment 2 showed that large sources affected attitudes heuristically, whereas only a small minority instigated systematic processing of the message. Experiment 3 manipulated the type of consensus information, either in terms of descriptive adjectives (large, small) or percentages (82%, 18%, 52%, 48%). When consensus was expressed in terms of descriptive adjectives, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 were replicated (large sources were more influential than small sources), but when consensus was expressed in terms of percentages, the majority was more influential than the minority, irrespective of group consensus.

Minority influence and argument generation

The theories of Moscovici (1980) and Nemeth (1986) concerning the cognitive processes underlying minority influence are examined in an argument generation paradigm. While Moscovici (1980) argues that minority influence increases the generation of arguments for and against the minority position, Nemeth (1986) proposes that minorities induce divergent thinking which leads to the generation of a wider range of arguments which are more original. In the first study, subjects read a minority text and then generated arguments concerning the minority issue within a specified time. The second study was similar to the first and included a condition where minority influence followed partial sensory deprivation (being placed in a dark, soundproof room for 45 minutes) which was predicted to decrease cognitive effort. Contrary to Moscovici, in neither study was there evidence that a minority led to more arguments being generated compared to a control condition (no influence). However, in one study, a minority led to more arguments being generated in the minority than in the majority direction. However, as predicted by Nemeth, in both studies a minority resulted in a wider range of arguments being generated than those proposed in the minority's message and these were rated by independent judges as being more original. Finally, as predicted, partial sensory deprivation led to a narrower range of arguments which were focused more upon issues raised in the minority text.

Minority influence and social categorization:a replication

The effects of ingroup and outgroup minorities upon public and private levels of influence was examined. The results show that whilst ingroup minorities have greater influence in public, outgroup minorities can have as much, if not more influence than ingroup minorities when responses are made in private. These results are consistent with previous research and support the social identijkation model of social influence.