Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission:evidence from India

Using bank-level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy, and also test whether the reaction of different types of banks to monetary policy changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank, and that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is likely to be much more effective in a tight money period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes on less risky short-term and more risky medium-term lending. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

The real effects of banking supervision:evidence from enforcement actions

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

Does lending behaviour of banks in emerging economies vary by ownership? Evidence from the Indian banking sector

While much has been discussed about the relationship between ownership and financial performance of banks in emerging markets, literature about cross-ownership differences in credit market behaviour of banks in emerging economies is sparse. Using a portfolio choice model and bank-level data from India for 9 years (1995–96 to 2003–04), we examine banks’ behaviour in the context of credit markets of an emerging market economy. Our results indicate that, in India, the data for the domestic banks fit well the aforementioned portfolio-choice model, especially for private banks, but the model cannot explain the behaviour of foreign banks. In general, allocation of assets between risk-free government securities and risky credit is affected by past allocation patterns, stock exchange listing (for private banks), risk averseness of banks, regulations regarding treatment of NPA, and ability of banks to recover doubtful credit. It is also evident that banks deal with changing levels of systematic risk by altering the ratio of securitized to non-securitized credit.