Auctions law and practice

This is the new edition of the leading work on the law and practice of auctions. The book looks at every aspect of auction practice from the economics of auction sales and restrictions on trading to criminal and other liabilities of the auctioneer. There is also a chapter on VAT. There have been important recent developments in the field of consumer protection and the book has been substantially revised to reflect these. In addition to general updating the new edition considers the practice of online auctions for the first time. There is also a section on looted art . The book continues to draw on case law from other common law jurisdictions.

Secondary market pricing behaviour around UK bond auctions

Using an event study approach, this article reports evidence that the UK Treasury bond market displayed anomalous pricing behaviour in the secondary market both immediately before and after auctions of seasoned bonds. Using a benchmark return derived from the behaviour of the underlying yield curve, the market offered statistically and economically significant excess returns, around the auctions held between 1992 and 2004. A cross-sectional analysis of the cumulative excess returns shows that the excess demand at the auctions is a key determinant of this excess return.

The implications of internet auctions for small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Great Britain

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Decentralised supply chain formation:a belief propagation-based approach

Decentralised supply chain formation involves determining the set of producers within a network able to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem is frequently tackled using auctions and negotiations. In this paper we show how it can be cast as an optimisation of a pairwise cost function. Optimising this class of functions is NP-hard but good approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP). Here we detail a LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralised message-passing between potential participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known double-auction method and an optimal centralised technique, showing several improvements: it obtains better solutions for most networks that admit a competitive equilibrium Competitive equilibrium as defined in [3] is used as a means of classifying results on certain networks to allow for minor inefficiencies in their auction protocol and agent bidding strategies. while also solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions.

Decentralized supply chain formation using max-sum loopy belief propagation

Supply chain formation is the process by which a set of producers within a network determine the subset of these producers able to form a chain to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem has been tackled in a number of ways, including auctions, negotiations, and argumentation-based approaches. In this paper we show how this problem can be cast as an optimization of a pairwise cost function. Optimizing this class of energy functions is NP-hard but efficient approximations to the global minimum can be obtained using loopy belief propagation (LBP). Here we detail a max-sum LBP-based approach to the supply chain formation problem, involving decentralized message-passing between supply chain participants. Our approach is evaluated against a well-known decentralized double-auction method and an optimal centralized technique, showing several improvements on the auction method: it obtains better solutions for most network instances which allow for competitive equilibrium (Competitive equilibrium in Walsh and Wellman is a set of producer costs which permits a Pareto optimal state in which agents in the allocation receive non-negative surplus and agents not in the allocation would acquire non-positive surplus by participating in the supply chain) while also optimally solving problems where no competitive equilibrium exists, for which the double-auction method frequently produces inefficient solutions. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How many contracts in an auction sale

Making sense of auction sales, in terms of English contract law, is no easy task. Despite the common perception of hammers hitting blocks, signifying the creation of the basic sale contract,1 a typical auction sale necessarily involves the making of several forms of contract other than the obvious primary sale agreement. The purpose of this article, therefore, is threefold, namely, to (1) examine these various forms of contractual relationship2 which may come into existence as a result of a traditional (face to face) auction sale; (2) consider specifically the selling of land at public auction with a view to advocating a change in the law requiring the formality of writing for sales contracts of land for both private and public auctions, and (3) compare briefly the contractual elements of an online ascending model of auction sale typified by the eBay phenomenon.

Improved adaptivity and robustness in decentralised multi-camera networks

In this paper we present increased adaptivity and robustness in distributed object tracking by multi-camera networks using a socio-economic mechanism for learning the vision graph. To build-up the vision graph autonomously within a distributed smart-camera network, we use an ant-colony inspired mechanism, which exchanges responsibility for tracking objects using Vickrey auctions. Employing the learnt vision graph allows the system to optimise its communication continuously. Since distributed smart camera networks are prone to uncertainties in individual cameras, such as failures or changes in extrinsic parameters, the vision graph should be sufficiently robust and adaptable during runtime to enable seamless tracking and optimised communication. To better reflect real smart-camera platforms and networks, we consider that communication and handover are not instantaneous, and that cameras may be added, removed or their properties changed during runtime. Using our dynamic socio-economic approach, the network is able to continue tracking objects well, despite all these uncertainties, and in some cases even with improved performance. This demonstrates the adaptivity and robustness of our approach.