The debate on human automatism in mid-Victorian England

During the 1830s, Marshall Hall carried out innumerable experiments on a great variety of animals to establish the concept of a ‘reflex arc’. In France F.L.Goltz showed that decerebrate frogs were still capable of complex behaviours. Thomas Laycock in England and Ivan Sechenov in Russia sought to apply the reflex idea to the brain. This paper follows the debate in the periodical literature of mid-Victorian England and discusses the contributions of WB Carpenter, Herbert Spencer, TH Huxley, W Clifford and others. The previous outing of this issue in the post-Cartesian seventeenth century had been largely suppressed by ecclesiastical authority. In the nineteenth century ecclesiastical power had waned, at least in England, and the debate could take a more open form. As neurophysiology and behavioural science developed, with the widespread acceptance of Darwinian evolution, it became more and more difficult to deny that brain and mind were part of the natural world and subject to the usual laws of cause and effect. This, of course, had powerful implications for the human self-image and for jurisprudence. These implications are still with us and the work of neurophysiologists such as Benjamin Libet have only reinforced them. Should humans be regarded as ‘automata’ and, if so, what becomes of ‘free will’, ‘responsibility’, and the rule of law? The Victorian debate is still useful and relevant.

Elementary units of cortical activity? The rise and fall of the cortical column

The roots of the concept of cortical columns stretch far back into the history of neuroscience. The impulse to compartmentalise the cortex into functional units can be seen at work in the phrenology of the beginning of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the next century Korbinian Brodmann and several others published treatises on cortical architectonics. Later, in the middle of that century, Lorente de No writes of chains of ‘reverberatory’ neurons orthogonal to the pial surface of the cortex and called them ‘elementary units of cortical activity’. This is the first hint that a columnar organisation might exist. With the advent of microelectrode recording first Vernon Mountcastle (1957) and then David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel provided evidence consistent with the idea that columns might constitute units of physiological activity. This idea was backed up in the 1970s by clever histochemical techniques and culminated in Hubel and Wiesel’s well-known ‘ice-cube’ model of the cortex and Szentogathai’s brilliant iconography. The cortical column can thus be seen as the terminus ad quem of several great lines of neuroscientific research: currents originating in phrenology and passing through cytoarchitectonics; currents originating in neurocytology and passing through Lorente de No. Famously, Huxley noted the tragedy of a beautiful hypothesis destroyed by an ugly fact. Famously, too, human visual perception is orientated toward seeing edges and demarcations when, perhaps, they are not there. Recently the concept of cortical columns has come in for the same radical criticism that undermined the architectonics of the early part of the twentieth century. Does history repeat itself? This paper reviews this history and asks the question.

The 'hard problem' and the quantum physicists. Part 2: modern times

This is the second part of a review of the work of quantum physicists on the ‘hard part’ of the problem of mind. After an introduction which sets the scene and a brief review of contemporary work on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) the work of four prominent modern investigators is examined: J.C. Eccles/Friedrich Beck; Henry Stapp; Stuart Hameroff/Roger Penrose; David Bohm. With the exception of David Bohm, all attempt to show where in the brain’s microstructure quantum affects could make themselves felt. It is reluctantly concluded that none have neurobiological plausibility. They are all instances, to paraphrase T.H. Huxley, of a beautiful hypothesis destroyed by ugly facts. David Bohm does not attempt to fit his new quantum physics to contemporary neurobiology but instead asks for a radical rethink of our conventional scientific paradigm. He suggests that we should look towards developing a ‘pan-experientialism’ or ‘dual-aspect monism’ where consciousness goes ‘all the way down’ and that the ‘hard problem’ is not soluble within the framework of ideas provided by ‘classical’ natural science.

Seeing and believing: three episodes in the history of neurophysiology

In this contribution I look at three episodes in the history of neurophysiology that bring out the complex relationship between seeing and believing. I start with Vesalius in the mid-sixteenth century who writes that he can in no way see any cavity in nerves, even in the optic nerves. He thus questions the age-old theory (dating back to the Alexandrians in the third century BC) but, because of the overarching psychophysiology of his time, does not press his case. This conflict between observation and theory persisted for a quarter of a millennium until finally resolved at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the discoveries of Galvani and Volta. The second case is provided by the early history of retinal synaptology. Schultze in 1866 had represented rod spherules and bipolar dendrites in the outer plexiform layer as being separated by a (synaptic) gap, yet in his written account, because of his theoretical commitments, held them to be continuous. Cajal later, 1892, criticized Schultze for this pusillanimity, but his own figure in La Cellule is by no means clear. It was only with the advent of the electron microscopy in the mid-twentieth century that the true complexity of the junction was revealed and it was shown that both investigators were partially right. My final example comes from the Hodgkin-Huxley biophysics of the 1950s. Their theory of the action potential depended on the existence of unseen ion pores with quite complex biophysical characteristics. These were not seen until the Nobel-Prize-winning X-ray diffraction analyses of the early twenty-first century. Seeing, even at several removes, then confirmed Hodgkin and Huxley’s belief. The relation between seeing and believing is by no means straightforward.