Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.

How important is ownership in a market with a level playing field? The Indian banking sector revisited

Private ownership of firms is often argued to lead to better firm performance than public ownership. However, the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence indicate that agency problems may affect the performance of privately owned firms. At the same time, competition and hard budget constraints can induce state-owned firms to operate efficiently. In India, banking sector reforms and deregulation were initiated in 1992, encouraging entry and establishing a level playing field for all banks. Data for the financial years 1995–1996 through 2000–2001 suggest that, by 1999–2000, ownership was no longer a significant determinant of performance. Rather, competition induced public-sector banks to eliminate the performance gap that existed between them and both domestic and foreign private-sector banks.