Are there theory of mind regions in the brain? A review of the neuroimaging literature

There have been many functional imaging studies of the brain basis of theory of mind (ToM) skills, but the findings are heterogeneous and implicate anatomical regions as far apart as orbitofrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobe. The functional imaging studies are reviewed to determine whether the diverse findings are due to methodological factors. The studies are considered according to the paradigm employed (e.g., stories vs. cartoons and explicit vs. implicit ToM instructions), the mental state(s) investigated, and the language demands of the tasks. Methodological variability does not seem to account for the variation in findings, although this conclusion may partly reflect the relatively small number of studies. Alternatively, several distinct brain regions may be activated during ToM reasoning, forming an integrated functional "network." The imaging findings suggest that there are several "core" regions in the network-including parts of the prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus-while several more "peripheral" regions may contribute to ToM reasoning in a manner contingent on relatively minor aspects of the ToM task. © 2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Representation, control, or reasoning? Distinct functions for theory of mind within the medial prefrontal cortex

The medial pFC (mPFC) is frequently reported to play a central role in Theory of Mind (ToM). However, the contribution of this large cortical region in ToM is not well understood. Combining a novel behavioral task with fMRI, we sought to demonstrate functional divisions between dorsal and rostral mPFC. All conditions of the task required the representation of mental states (beliefs and desires). The level of demands on cognitive control (high vs. low) and the nature of the demands on reasoning (deductive vs. abductive) were varied orthogonally between conditions. Activation in dorsal mPFC was modulated by the need for control, whereas rostral mPFC was modulated by reasoning demands. These findings fit with previously suggested domain-general functions for different parts of mPFC and suggest that these functions are recruited selectively in the service of ToM.

Current knowledge on the role of the inferior frontal gyrus in Theory of Mind - a commentary on Schurz and Tholen (2016)

Schurz and Tholen (2016) argue that common approaches to studying the neural basis of “theory of mind” (ToM) obscure a potentially important role for inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in managing conflict between perspectives, and urge new work to address this question: “to gain a full understanding of the IFG's role in ToM, we encourage future imaging studies to use a wider range of control conditions.” (p332). We wholeheartedly agree, but note that this observation has been made before, and has already led to a programme of work that provides evidence from fMRI, EEG, and TMS on the role of IFG in managing conflict between self and other perspectives in ToM. We highlight these works, and in particular we demonstrate how careful manipulation within ToM tasks has been used to act as an internal control condition, wherein conflict has been manipulated within-subject. We further add to the discussion by framing key questions that remain regarding IFG in the context of these. Using limitations in the existing research, we outline how best researchers can proceed with the challenge set by Schurz and Tholen (2016).

Philosophy's loss, neurology's gain:the endeavor of John Hughlings-Jackson

The year 2011 marked the centenary of the death of one of the founders of British neurology, John Hughlings-Jackson (1835-1911). By common consent he was a great clinician. But he was more. He endeavored to use clinical observations to throw light on one of the great problems of the modern world, the problem of mind. Hughlings-Jackson's daily contact with mentalities warped by neurological disease caused him to ponder deeply the nature of the mind-brain relationship, nowadays often known simply as the "hard problem. " In particular, he saw the danger of conflating mind and brain, a danger that has grown greater with the spectacular growth of neuroscientific knowledge during the last century. Although Hughlings-Jackson's neuroscientific thought is long outdated, his philosophic endeavors remain highly instructive. © 2012 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

An overview of psychological and neurobiological mechanisms by which early negative experiences increase risk of mood disorders

Objective: Early life experiences are associated with severe and long-lasting effects on behavioural and emotional functioning, which in turn are thought to increase the risk for unipolar depression and other disorders of affect regulation. The neurobiological and psychological mechanisms through which adverse early life experiences confer risk are poorly understood. Method: Alterations in brain structure and function in limbic and prefrontal cortical regions have been linked to early negative experiences and to mood disorders. Results: There are a number of psychological domains that may be dysfunctional in people with mood disorders, and which, if the dysfunction occurs prior to onset of mood symptoms, may signify a risk factor for depression. Cognitive dysfunction has been examined in patients with mood disorders, with some suggestion that changes in cognitive function may antedate the onset of mood symptoms, and may be exacerbated in those who experienced early negative trauma. Social cognition, including emotion comprehension, theory of mind and empathy, represent under-studied domains of psychological function that may be negatively influenced by early adverse experience. Temperament and personality factors may also leave people vulnerable to mood instability. Conclusion: This review summarizes the evidence for dysfunction in each of these domains for people with mood disorders.