Investing in conflict zones:a firm-level analysis

The purpose of this paper is to examine, using panel data econometric techniques, the determinants of a firm’s strategy to invest in a conflict location. To the best of our knowledge this has not been done before. We use a large database of firm-level data that includes 2858 multinational firms that have a subsidiary in a developing country (during 1999-2006). Out of these firms 290 are classified as having a subsidiary in a conflict location. The choice of a conflict location is based on data from the Inter Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We start with the population of multinationals who have chosen to invest in low income countries with weak institutions. Our analysis then proceeds to explain the decision of those firms to invest in conflict locations. We have four hypotheses: (1) Firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to invest in a conflict region; (2) Firms from countries with weaker institutions are more likely to invest in conflict regions; (3) Firms and Countries with less concern over corporate social responsibility are more likely to invest in conflict countries; and (4) that there is large sector level differences in the propensity to invest in a conflict region. The results suggest that all of these hypotheses can be confirmed.

How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review

Aim: To systematically review, using a qualitative, narrative synthesis approach, papers examining alcohol industry efforts to influence alcohol marketing policy, and compare with those used by the tobacco industry. Methods: Literature searches were conducted between April and July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Papers were included if they: made reference to alcohol industry efforts to influence (a) policy debates concerning marketing regulations, (b) new specific marketing policies or (c) broad alcohol policy which included marketing regulations; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-2013. Alcohol industry political activity was categorized into strategies/tactics and frames/arguments. Data extraction was undertaken by the lead author and 100% of the papers were fully second-reviewed. Seventeen papers met the review criteria. Results: Five main political strategies and five main frames were identified. The alcohol industry argues against marketing regulation by emphasizing industry responsibility and the effectiveness of self-regulation, questioning the effectiveness of statutory regulation and by focusing on individual responsibility. Arguments relating to industry responsibility are often reinforced through corporate social responsibility activities. The industry primarily conveys its arguments through manipulating the evidence base and by promoting ineffective voluntary codes and non-regulatory initiatives. Conclusions: The alcohol industry's political activity is more varied than existing models of corporate political activity suggest. The industry's opposition to marketing regulation centres on claims that the industry is responsible and that self regulation is effective. There are considerable commonalities between tobacco and alcohol industry political activity, with differences due potentially to differences in policy contexts and perceived industry legitimacy.

Exposing and addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-income countries

The tobacco industry's future depends on increasing tobacco use in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), which face a growing burden of tobacco-related disease, yet have potential to prevent full-scale escalation of this epidemic. To drive up sales the industry markets its products heavily, deliberately targeting non-smokers and keeps prices low until smoking and local economies are sufficiently established to drive prices and profits up. The industry systematically flaunts existing tobacco control legislation and works aggressively to prevent future policies using its resource advantage to present highly misleading economic arguments, rebrand political activities as corporate social responsibility, and establish and use third parties to make its arguments more palatable. Increasingly it is using domestic litigation and international arbitration to bully LMICs from implementing effective policies and hijacking the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain, attempting to put itself in control of an illegal trade in which there is overwhelming historical evidence of its complicity. Progress will not be realised until tobacco industry interference is actively addressed as outlined in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Exemplar LMICs show this action can be achieved and indicate that exposing tobacco industry misconduct is an essential first step.