From bilateral to trilateral governance in local government contracting in France

In France, the tradition of contracting out local public services has been predominantly one of partnership and co-operation rather than competition and antagonism. However, in recent years the traditional approach has come under intense criticism, something which has far-reaching implications for public-private governance. Adopting the socio-legal approach to the study of contract governance set out by Peter Vincent-Jones, this paper explores the discrepancy between descriptions of a traditional French approach to local public services governance, in which the bilateral values of trust and co-operation are emphasized, and a new discourse of local public services governance, which argues for detailed contract planning and close contract monitoring. It is argued that this discrepancy reveals the beginning of a shift in the governance of public service exchange relationships from relatively noncontractual and bilateral to relatively contractual and trilateral. The French case highlights the importance of regulatory and accountability frameworks to the manner in which contracting parties perceive exchange governance. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005.

The EU's support for democratic governance in the Eastern neighbourhood:the role of transition experience from the New Member States

The European Union seems to place an increasing rhetorical emphasis on harnessing the transition experience of the new member states. This article examines whether the EU actually makes use of this experience in its promotion of democratic governance in the eastern neighbourhood. The main conclusion is that while reform priorities of the EU in the region are aligned with transition experience, the actual participation of actors from the new members in implementing EU-financed projects aimed at promoting democratic governance is limited. This contradiction should be resolved or it will further erode the credibility of the EU's external policies.

Networked governance and the regulation of expression on the Internet:the blurring of the role of public and private actors as content regulators

This editorial provides an overview of the themes of network governance and content regulation that are expanded upon in the subsequent articles, identifying key issues and concerns that are prevalent in the literature in this field. In particular, this text considers governance not as an Internet-specific phenomenon, but as a global phenomenon, identifying and discussing literature pertaining to governance both online and offline, and providing examples of theories that seek to explain these forms of governance. Focusing on the interaction between public and private actors in content regulation, this editorial highlights that content regulation is a complex and contested issue that cannot be separated from its social and cultural contexts, and provides an overview of the articles contained.

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation:an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

From ‘poor parenting’ to micro-management:coalition governance and the sponsorship of arm’s-length bodies in the United Kingdom, 2010–13

The delegation of public tasks to arm’s-length bodies remains a central feature of contemporary reform agendas within both developed and developing countries. The role and capacity of political and administrative principals (i.e. ministers and departments of state) to control the vast network of arm’s-length bodies for which they are formally responsible is therefore a critical issue within and beyond academe. In the run-up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom, the ‘quango conundrum’ emerged as an important theme and all three major parties committed themselves to shift the balance of power back towards ministers and sponsor departments. This article presents the results of the first major research project to track and examine the subsequent reform process. It reveals a stark shift in internal control relationships from the pre-election ‘poor parenting’ model to a far tighter internal situation that is now the focus of complaints by arm’s-length bodies of micro-management. This shift in the balance of power and how it was achieved offers new insights into the interplay between different forms of governance and has significant theoretical and comparative relevance. Points for practitioners: For professionals working in the field of arm’s-length governance, the article offers three key insights. First, that a well-resourced core executive is critical to directing reform given the challenges of implementing reform in a context of austerity. Second, that those implementing reform will also need to take into account the diverse consequences of centrally imposed reform likely to result in different departments with different approaches to arm’s-length governance. Third, that reforming arm’s-length governance can affect the quality of relationships, and those working in the field will need to mitigate these less tangible challenges to ensure success.