CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends

We investigate the role of CEO power and government monitoring on bank dividend policy for a sample of 109 European listed banks for the period 2005-2013. We employ three main proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and unforced CEO turnover. We show that CEO power has a negative impact on dividend payout ratios and on performance, suggesting that entrenched CEOs do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. Stronger internal monitoring by board of directors, as proxied by larger ownership stakes of the board members, increases performance but decreases payout ratios. These findings are contrary to those from the entrenchment literature for non-financial firms. Government ownership and the presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank, also reduces payout ratios, in line with the view that government is incentivized to favor the interest of bank creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. These results show that government regulators are mainly concerned about bank safety and this allows powerful CEOs to distribute low payouts at the expense of minority shareholders.

Distress risk, growth and earnings quality

We extend and complement prior work by investigating the earnings quality of firms with different financial health characteristics and growth prospects. By using three alternative measures of default likelihood and two alternative measures of growth options, without being limited to a specific event, we provide a more comprehensive setup for analysing the earnings characteristics of the universe of firms than examining distressed firms with persistent losses, dividend reductions or bankruptcy-filings. Our dataset consists of 15,049 healthy U.S. firms over the period 1990-2004. Results show that the relation between earnings quality and financial health is not monotonic. Distressed firms have a low level of earnings timeliness for bad news and a high level for good news, and manage earnings toward a positive target more frequently than healthy firms. On the other hand, healthy firms have a high level of earnings timeliness for bad news. Growth aspects play an important role in a firm's ability to manage earnings. In contrast to the findings of prior studies, growth firms have greater earnings timeliness for bad news, whereas value firms manage earnings toward a positive target more frequently than growth firms. © 2011 The Authors. Abacus© 2011 Accounting Foundation, The University of Sydney.

Stock price and volume effects associated with changes in the composition of the FTSE Bursa Malaysian KLCI

We examine the stock price and volume effects associated with changes in the composition of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI), over the time period of 2005–2012. We find evidence to support the price pressure hypothesis for both additions to and deletions from the KLCI. This is because significant stock price and trading volume effects in the pre index revision period are entirely reversed after the announcement of the news. Our empirical findings can be explained by the market microstructure literature. Significant changes in liquidity cause trading volume and stock prices to reverse back to their original level before the index revisions took place.